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Abstract For some years now, the concept of basic research has been under
attack. Yet although the significance of the concept is in doubt, basic research
continues to be used as an analytical category in science studies. But what exactly is
basic research? What is the difference between basic and applied research? This
article seeks to answer these questions by applying historical semantics. I argue that
the concept of basic research did not arise out of the tradition of pure science. On
the contrary, this new concept emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a
time when scientists were being confronted with rising expectations regarding the
societal utility of science. Scientists used the concept in order to try to bridge the
gap between the promise of utility and the uncertainty of scientific endeavour. Only
after 1945, when United States science policy shaped the notion of basic research,
did the concept revert to the older ideals of pure science. This revival of the purity
discourse was caused by the specific historical situation in the US at that time: the
need to reform federal research policy after the Second World War, the new
dimension of ethical dilemmas in science and technology during the atomic era, and
the tense political climate during the Cold War.
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For some years now, the concept of basic research has been under attack. Its relevance
has been questioned empirically as a result of changes in academic research,
normatively with respect to science policy, and even theoretically in science and
technology studies. Yet while the significance of the concept is in doubt, basic research
is still a very common analytical category, deployed not least as a means of
distinguishing the new future science policy from the old ideal of basic research. But
what exactly is basic research? What is the difference between basic and applied
research? Aside from a few exceptional studies (Calvert 2006; Godin 2005a; Pielke
2012), science studies have only just begun to seriously reflect upon these questions.
When and why did the concept of basic research emerge in the first place? Is the ideal
of basic research nothing more than a relaunch of the older pure-science discourse?
Historical semantics appears to be a useful approach for answering these questions
because its historical perspective provides the conceptual clarity required both in
current debates in science and technology studies and public debates on science policy.
In the 1990s, sociological studies claimed that science was undergoing profound
changes. Since then, prominent labels such as ‘‘Mode 2’’ or ‘‘triple helix’’ have
come to signify a new way of organizing science and technology that transgresses
institutional boundaries between universities, industry, and governmental research.
According to the alleged paradigm shift from Mode 1 to Mode 2, application-
oriented research programmes with cooperative and transdisciplinary project teams
have replaced the former university-centred basic research mode. Proponents of this
new way of comprehending knowledge production even call for science policy to be
modified in order to reflect the altered research mode (Gibbons et al. 1994;
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997). Our ‘‘Leonardo world’’, as portrayed by Ju¨rgen
Mittelstraß, is ruled by the imperative of technology. The interplay of science and
technology raises society’s expectations of research applications, even when the
outcomes sometimes turn out to be risky (Mittelstraß 1994). These arguments have
certainly shaped the debates in science and technology studies and science policy in
recent years, although discussions about the degree of change and how to evaluate it
remain controversial (Weingart 2008; Greenberg 2007).
According to studies addressing these historical shifts in science, basic research
determined the status quo ante. These studies describe basic research as an
application-disinterested mode of research embedded in a disciplinary and academic
setting that contrasts, in respect of every analytical feature, to Mode 2. The concept
of Mode 1, however, is not based upon profound historical analysis; it rather appears
to represent the previously prevailing sociological perspective on science in the
tradition of Robert Merton, who emphasized disinterestedness and universalism as
central characteristics of modern science. Yet historical studies suggest that the way
in which science was organized had already undergone significant change in the early
20th century, as politicians, scientists, and industry formed a new alliance from
which all three groups hoped to benefit (Ash 2002; Mowery and Rosenberg 1993).
Moreover, although recent debates in science studies have demonstrated high
levels of discontent with the notion of basic research, producing instead new
analytic labels like triple helix or Mode 2, the term ‘‘basic research’’ and its
antonym ‘‘applied research’’ continue to frame the discourse about science, without
any awareness of both terms’ historical conditionality as discursive strategies in
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research policy. The semantic dichotomy merely gives way to a continuum between
basic and applied research in which the favourite mode, the ‘‘use-inspired basic
research’’ (in German ‘‘anwendungsorientierte Grundlagenforschung’’), is located
somewhere in the middle of the continuum (Stokes 1997; Mittelstraß 1994).
However, aside from the motif of application, we lack an explicit set of distinctive
criteria because studies persist in assuming basic research to be a given category.
In other studies, categories such as basic and applied research no longer play a
major role. Research grounded in approaches such as actor-network theory, that is
studies emphasizing the societal context of science, anthropological studies focusing
on day-to-day laboratory work, and the new – although still vague – concept of
technoscience are united in their critique of discursive boundaries, which they claim
to obstruct the view on the reality of research. While research dealing with Mode 2
indicates the change within the historical development of science, those supporting
these new approaches call for a change in theoretical perspective. Bruno Latour, one
of the most famous proponents of this idea, identifies demarcations such as nature/
society or science/technology as a typically modern delusion covering, albeit quite
successfully, the hybrid character of research (Latour 1993). Claiming an overall
paradigm shift for the social sciences, Latour suspects that traditional sociology has
frozen thought within boundaries and institutional separations in its studies for quite
a long time and levels his criticisms at a static display of society blind to the
dynamics of interactions (Latour 2005). For Latour, the distinction between basic
and applied research is supposed to be part of these delusive demarcations: such a
simple dichotomous order cannot represent the ‘‘complicated and unpredictable
relations between scientists and other agencies’’ (Latour 1987: 117). Latour argues
that the high esteem in which basic science is held does not correspond with the
reality of technoscience. In his early call for the concept of technoscience, he even
argued statistically, interpreting the high proportion of spending on development
and applied research in contrast to that spent on basic research evident in research
and development statistics as indicative of the real importance of technology and the
level of overall support it receives within society (Latour 1987: esp. 168–173).
Latour’s argument about modern delusions and his opposition to a basic-
research-centred perspective on science have found resonance among some
historians of science. For instance, Peter Dear identifies the ideology of modern
science as misrepresenting the reality of research in the natural sciences. Although,
according to Dear, some effort has been made to integrate the instrumental and
useful character of the natural sciences in the tradition of science since Francis
Bacon, natural philosophy, with its ideal of contemplative understanding, has
retained the upper hand (Dear 2005: 404). From an historical point of view, this
discrepancy between the philosophical notion of science and research practice
appears as an anachronism requiring explanation. In general, criticism levelled at
the long-prevailing ideal of pure science has led to a reorientation in the history of
science that includes the applied side of science and opens up the field to the history
of technology (Forman 2010). Recent studies look beyond the academic core – the
universities – and into industrial laboratories, where the majority of researchers
have worked throughout the 20th century (Shapin 2008).
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Despite this growing awareness of the ideological or normative character of basic
research, the majority of historians still use the concept as a given, analytical
category without questioning its relationship to varying historical contexts. Studies
on German war-time science, for instance, try to determine to which extreme of the
basic-applied continuum the examined research projects tended.1 As to the history
of US science and innovation policy, the concept of basic research seems to be
inevitably associated with the name of Vannevar Bush and the reorganization of US
science after the Second World War. The basic-applied taxonomy is therefore
primarily regarded as representation of the institutional logic of modern research
organization: the so-called linear model which coined the idea of innovation process
for so many years. Investigating the negotiation of science policy in the 1940s,
historical studies have revealed dissenting political preferences and conflictive
institutional interests, demonstrating that the post-war order in science policy had
initially been highly contested. However, although the historical contingency of the
concept has thus become more and more apparent, many historians still do not
reflect on the meanings and functions of the concept of basic research. Even the
meteoric career of this relatively young term does not seem to be puzzling
historians. They rather interpret the concept as additional part of an existing
taxonomy, ‘‘supplementing’’ the former ‘‘language of pure and applied science’’
(Dennis 2004: 225). As a result, the concept of basic research has been locked up in
a black box next to ‘‘pure science’’ whose meaning is also still enigmatic (Galison
2008). It is only recently that the investigation of shifting functions, varying
meanings and symbolic dimensions of the concept of basic research – beyond the
institutional level of research organization and funding – have become an object of
interest in the history of science (Krige 2006).2
What remains of the current debates in science and technology studies is the
question as to why demarcations such as basic and applied research have occurred at
all. If Latour is right in pointing out that the concepts of basic and applied research
do not represent actual research practices, why have these terms become so
important? Which (other) functions have they fulfilled? More precisely, what has
‘‘basic research’’ meant for the identity of science and for its relationship to
technology? Which role has the concept of basic research played in science policy,
that is in the negotiations between science and society about aims and values of
research? And how has the concept affected the public image of science?
This article therefore seeks to analyze the genesis of the concept of basic research
up until the early 1960s, by which time it had become a common concept in science
policy in the West. It will also take a brief look at discourses on pure science
prevalent in the 19th century as a means of establishing the effects of historical
legacy and variation over time. This study has two central aims. Firstly, it intends to
detect the different semantic dimensions of basic research – its institutional,
1 See the subsection ‘‘The discursive strategy of ‘fundamental research’ and the reassessment of German
science in the Nazi period’’ below for more details.
2 Given the recently growing interest in the relationship between science and technology, the reflection
on terms like ‘‘applied science’’ seems to have started a little bit earlier (Bud 2012a, b; Gooday 2012;




epistemic, ethical, social, and political attributions. Secondly, it discusses the
significance of the concept of basic research in the natural sciences, in research
policy, and in science studies: to which historical challenges faced by research in the
20th century did the concept of basic research respond?
I argue that the concepts of basic research and fundamental research did not arise
out of the 19th-century tradition of pure science, which had idealized research as an
intrinsically philosophical search for eternal truth. On the contrary, these new concepts
emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries at a time when society’s expectations
regarding the utility of science were rising sharply. In the knowledge that research
output is hard to predict, scientists used these concepts to bridge the gap between the
promise of utility and the uncertainty of scientific endeavour. Only after 1945, when
US policy strongly shaped the notion of basic research, did these concepts revert to the
older ideals of pure science. In order to understand this revival of the purity discourse,
we need to take the specific historical situation of the post-war US into account, in
particular the new plans for federal funding of research, the new dimension of ethical
dilemmas faced by science and technology following Hiroshima, and the overall
political climate of the Cold-War era. The insights gained from historical semantics
show that basic research was not – and cannot be – considered a clearly distinguishable
analytical mode of research. After 1945, the concept of basic research formed part of a
discursive strategy that adjusted scientific research to complex and even contradictory
societal requirements; it was for these socio-political reasons that the concept became
so important. Consequently, moral and ideological attributions were and still are
inseparably tied to the concept of basic research.
American and German discourses provide the empirical basis of this study. Yet
this article is not intended as a fully-fledged comparative study of two countries.
Rather, I analyze Germany and the US because these countries were considered
best-practice models in science at varying points in time and they both share a long
history of mutual exchange and learning. At different points in time, each of the two
countries allows us to trace the emergence and evolution of specific understandings
of the role of science in society. The first section on the older pure-science ideals of
the 19th century revolves mainly around Germany, which had become a leading
science nation at that time. In the following section, which discusses how the
concept of basic research emerged and evolved until 1945, the German experience
also takes centre stage. The third section covers US science policy from the Second
World War until the early 1960s, when the term basic research had become
established as a key concept in science policy. The article ends, on a more
comparative note, with a short history of the concept of basic research in post-war
Germany. The second and the third sections overlap in time because the Second
World War and the post-war period require a more comparative perspective. For a
long time, scientific research during the Nazi period was thought to represent a
turning away from all fundamental principles of science. The war, however,
confronted both US and German scientists with similar political demands and
requirements. After 1945, US policy became a role model for the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany). Before the empirical analysis commences, however,
the next section will introduce readers to historical semantics and discuss how I will
use this approach to structure the empirical discussion.
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Some Remarks on Historical Semantics
This study resorts to approaches in conceptual history and discourse analysis.
Discourse analysis fits with the research questions for several reasons. Firstly, it is
designed to make visible what is taken for granted when people think or talk about
social phenomena and the implicit rules that apply in the practice of framing topics.
Secondly, discourse analysis identifies classifications and demarcations, such as the
distinction between basic and applied research, as essential strategies in discursive
practice. Thirdly, it is based on the assumption that discursive production is
historically contingent. Whereas discourse analysis strives, in the main, to analyze
patterns of assertions, conceptual history focuses on semantics and key concepts.
Especially the latter takes the polysemy of language and communication into
account. Moreover, conceptual history’s foundation in the philosophy of history
means that it offers us assumptions about semantic shifts over time.
In contrast to the tradition of semantic analyses in the philosophy of science,
which is mainly interested in the epistemic impact of metaphors (Blumenberg
2010), my study is based on a strand of historical semantics rooted in historical
studies on the dawn of modernity. It focuses on key concepts in social and political
language. If we assume that basic research is largely a concept of science policy or
of negotiations between the scientific community and the public, then this approach
seems more suitable for this study. Moreover, conceptual history is embedded in
reflections about the philosophy of history. According to Reinhart Koselleck, the
major proponent of the German school of conceptual history, a shifting societal
dictionary – the emergence of neologisms or changes in semantic attributions –
indicates historical upheaval. Key concepts and parts of their meanings, however,
may persist, so that old and new semantic dimensions coexist. Koselleck’s approach
thus corresponds with approaches in the philosophy of history that take different
layers of time into account. Koselleck clearly demonstrates that language is not an
epiphenomenon of reality, but rather that it frames both human experience and the
way in which society perceives the world. He conceives key concepts as cognitive
strategies designed to deal with reality, especially in situations where expectation
and experience diverge. Ideologies, in particular, are supposed to compensate
semantically for a lack of convergence between expectations and experiences
(Koselleck 2006: 85).
Whereas Koselleck’s conceptual history defines key concepts primarily as
cognitive strategies of the human that deal with reality, discourse analysis goes
further in assuming that discursive strategies might serve various societal functions.
In his commentary on the concept of the dispositive, Michel Foucault emphasized
that discourses, non-discursive practices, institutions, and objects are linked by
common strategic functions. This does not mean, however, that the outcome of such
a strategic dispositive necessarily corresponds to the initial function. On the one
hand, novel discourses have the power to set new practices or different forms of
institutional organization. On the other hand, it is also possible that emerging
discourses provide existing institutions or operations with new legitimacy. The
history of dispositives also turns out to be quite complex. Taking Foucault’s remarks
on the philosophy of history into account, the concept of the dispositive is quite
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similar to Koselleck’s idea of a complex history of different layers of time lying
upon one another (Schauz 2010).
Since discourse analysis has progressed by adapting aspects of polysemy, the
combination with conceptual historical approaches has become more obvious. One
approach appears to be particularly fruitful for investigating the history of basic
research: Ju¨rgen Link’s idea of ‘‘collective symbols’’, which came about when Link
dealt with the problem of interdiscursive processes. Link believes that multiple
meanings of metaphors and symbols are capable of linking different discourses
demonstrating diverse patterns of assertions (Link 1986). In other words, metaphors
can bridge discursive gaps. With regard to this study, science policy may be
described as one such interdiscursive process in which scientific expectations
encounter society’s expectations. And, without anticipating the detailed analysis of
the concept of basic research below, it is obvious that ‘‘basic’’ as the first part of the
compound offers a variety of possible interpretations.
Of course, discourse analysis also has a tradition in science studies, in particular
regarding demarcation discourses. Most relevant in this context is Thomas F.
Gieryn’s study (1999) on the cultural boundaries of science, which he identifies as
resulting from professional boundary work. According to Gieryn, boundary work
does not represent fixed or institutional demarcations, but is rather a dynamic
process of negotiations with contested boarders and regenerated situations of
uncertainty. Gieryn stresses that boundaries linked to key concepts such as pure
science vary according to special situations and social circumstances. Unlike
Gieryn, however, I do not expect that discursive practices revolving around basic
research are strategies exclusively used by scientists to protect their professional
interests. Moreover, I doubt that the discursive function of basic research can be
restricted to boundary work.
In summary, this study is based upon the followings assumptions derived from
conceptual history, discourse analysis, and studies on scientific boundary work. The
attributions and linked demarcations of basic research are expected to vary
according to space and time. Prior semantic dimensions, however, might persist or
experience revival. The emergence of basic research as a new term may at least
indicate an historical shift in either science or its role in society. The abstractness of
the term basic research offers a wide range of meanings and discursive strategies.
The concept has the potential to function as a collective symbol for science policy
that links different discourses within society. Given its variability, this key concept
of science policy, together with its antonyms, cannot be interpreted as representing
fixed institutional boundaries. Rather, the concepts seem to emerge in situations of
uncertainty or cognitive dissonance. Yet they may legitimize the institutional
organization of research or define operative goals. Moreover, the discourses
revolving around basic research communicate a wide range of ideals, expectations,
promises, as well on professional and public claims.
Finally, there are some preliminary methodological remarks that need to be
addressed. Although the study focuses on the concept of basic research, it also has to
detect conceptual variations and alternative or concurrent terms, not to mention
antonyms. Relevant terms for the US case are basic research, fundamental research,
pure science and basic science. Antonyms and concurrent terms like applied
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research, applied science, contract research and mission-oriented research are
included as far as they are needed to analyze the meanings of basic research, but
their own conceptual histories will not be analyzed at full length. For the German
case, these terms are Grundlagenforschung, reine Wissenschaft, reine Forschung,
angewandte Forschung, angewandte Wissenschaft and Zweckforschung.
With regard to conducting the discourse analysis, it was most relevant to compile
a broad sample of documents enabling me to identify prevalent, repeated patterns of
assertions.3 Besides key texts from scientists well-established in research organi-
zation, the sample also covers texts produced for normal-science communication.4
The study is thus based on published documents relating to science policy as well as
on scientific articles and books. Especially the volumes of the American journal
Science and its German counterpart Die Naturwissenschaften have been subjected to
systematic analysis. Furthermore, electronic search functions, in particular those
enabling full-text searches with the keywords listed above, have been most useful
for periods in which concepts were not yet commonplace. The digital library of
Google Books is an important tool for historical semantics because it enables us to
detect texts which might otherwise be overlooked by more traditional research
strategies based on library holdings and cross references. As such, Google Books
provides a unique tool for tracing both the emergence and diffusion of concepts.
However, given that text acquisition in Google Books is dynamic and not entirely
transparent to the user, it is difficult to delineate the corpus of books actually
contained within its database. Thus Google Books may not be easy to use for
scholars interested in exact bibliometric analysis, but it can help researchers gain a
rough idea of when certain concepts began to be used and how use of these concepts
became more or less common across different periods of time and within different
language communities. This is how the current article uses the information derived
from Google Books.
Pure Science in the 19th Century: The Natural Sciences and the Philosophical
Tradition of Academia
As studies have so far located the concept of basic research in the tradition of pure-
science ideals, the following section will deal with the term’s prehistory as a means
of tracking continuities and breaks in the way science perceived itself. The notion of
pure science and the conceptual opposition between ‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘applied’’ in
science can be traced back to the 18th century. The attributes of ‘‘pure’’ and
‘‘applied’’ referred in turn to the much older, classical distinction between theory
3 In contrast to older approaches of historical semantics like intellectual history or the history of ideas,
which cling to the idea of authorship and reception theory, discourse analysis does not aim at identifying
the pedigree of new concepts or arguments in detail. Instead of singling out individual statements or
discussing personal rationales, discourse analysis rather tries to find common patters of arguments that are
shared by many discourse participants.
4 The cited sources and documents do not represent the whole sample of texts. The texts I refer to in this
article were chosen because they exemplify broader discursive strategies revolving around the concept of
basic research in a particularly typical way.
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and practice that had undergone reinterpretation during the Scientific Revolution.
Back then, Francis Bacon and his contemporaries had tried to conflate the new
empirical and instrumental form of knowledge of nature with the older tradition of
natural philosophy and its idea of contemplative understanding (Dear 2005:
393–397). In the late 18th century, these attributes became important once again for
natural scientists positioning themselves within the academic community for the
purposes of finding a way into the university system. Although states such as Prussia
demanded ever more instrumental knowledge and technical education for their
mining industries or other state-owned enterprises (Klein 2010), natural scientists
had to adjust to the predominant philosophical understanding of science5 at
universities, which, even then, consisted only of philosophical, theological, legal,
and medical faculties.
In the case of chemistry, Christoph Meinel has already demonstrated that, in the
Age of Enlightenment, chemists labelled their discipline as ‘‘pure and applied’’ so
that chemistry could become an acceptable subject at universities, shedding its older
status as an auxiliary science of medicine (Meinel 1985). Due to its empirical
approach and its utilitarian orientation, chemistry was still classified as an ‘‘art’’
rather than as a ‘‘science’’ in the 18th century. Academic teaching had hitherto
focused on imparting theoretical knowledge and established theorems, that is pure
science. In contrast, the applied sciences represented experience-based knowledge
on the epistemic level; at the same time ‘‘applied’’ denoted research with a practical
purpose. Both aspects of these so-called applied sciences did not (yet) fit into the
philosophical tradition of universities. By striving to become a part of this academic
institution, chemists had to stress both the pure scientific and applied aspects of their
discipline (Meinel 1985; Bud and Roberts 1984).
At the very same time, philosophy was engaged in reviving the controversy
between rationalism and empiricism that solidified a hierarchical concept of
knowledge. As a consequence of the philosophical longing for the wholeness and
absoluteness of ideas, a posteriori approaches continually played a subordinate role
in contrast to a priori and metaphysical ways of knowing (Ross 1962: 68–69). The
concept of cognition process in science turned out to be one-way: from the general
to the particular. This concept of scientific progress implied the possibility of
deducing endless applications and specific, context-linked knowledge from
universal principles such as the laws of nature. The advancement of knowledge,
however, was not supposed to take place the other way around. This distinction
between pure and applied science thus corresponded to institutional and epistemic
settings in the scientific community of the late 18th and 19th centuries.
The Natural Sciences Face Challenges from Engineering and Technological
Success
In the mid-19th century the pure/applied boundary started focusing on the
distinction between the natural sciences and technology. The common definition
5 In the German-speaking context, the term science is not restricted to natural sciences. This also applied
to the English-speaking academia in early modern times.
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of technology as applied natural sciences represented a special version of this one-
way concept of knowledge. This definition was widespread – even economists
believed in the one-way relationship between science and technology. They
assumed that only scientific discoveries and theories paved the way for innovations:
‘‘Technical science may stimulate pure science to a certain extent, but, on the
whole, technology is much more at the receiving end. Pure science is always further
ahead of applied science, and never the other way round. However, technology
finally turns science into a common good’’ (Ro¨ssler 1857: 179, translation by DS).
It was above all the community of natural scientists that wanted to preserve the
hierarchical distinction between science and technology. The scientific foundation
and the aspiring academic status of engineering in the second half of the 19th
century challenged the scientific profession, in particular physicists (Gieryn 1999:
51–62). As the natural sciences had only recently assumed their place within the
university, the legacy of natural philosophy and its epistemic and moral ideals, such
as the unrewarded dedication to science for its own sake, was even stronger than the
century before (Dear 2005: 401–404). Having scarcely ascended to the league of the
pure sciences, the natural sciences even adopted the idea of an eternal truth defined
by the discovery of natural laws.
The words of German physician Rudolf Virchow represent this adapted concept
of pure science, but, more importantly, they also show that this purity discourse was
not without contradictions. With the economic success of technical innovations and
the growing appreciation of engineers within society throughout the German
Empire, Virchow and his colleagues increasingly forged a link between themselves
and the promise of technical progress in order to promote the idea of indispensable
scientific endeavour:
All the benefits that have emerged from the steam engine, from telegraphy,
photography, chemical discoveries, the production of colours and so on and so
forth, all these benefits are based on scientific theorems that we men of science
have unveiled, and not until we are absolutely sure that they are laws of nature,
we pass these truths on to the general public so that others can work with them
and create new things that nobody could imagine before, that no one has ever
dreamt of, that see the light of day for the first time and transform the character
of society and the state. (Virchow 1877: 8–9, translation by DS)
Compared with the great engineering inventions of the 19th century and their
noticeable effects on everyday life and society as a whole, scientific progress was
less visible. In a way, this poor visibility was one aspect of the ideal of the pure
scientist in its philosophical tradition: a scholar who, in solitude, dedicates life and
work to science, driven by the sole motive of finding the truth – or at least
contributing his tiny part to the scientific community’s joint effort – even without
any prospect of public acknowledgement. In fact, as Peter Dear put it, ‘‘the authority
of science in the modern world rests to a considerable extent on the idea that it is
powerful, that it can do things’’ (Dear 2005: 404). Yet, the scientific strategy of
technological promise in order to gain greater visibility, support, and acknowledg-
ment appeared risky; the scientific pledge to technological progress needed a show
of confidence. Given the uncertainty and contingency of scientific advancement, it
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seemed even harder to predict if or when discoveries would lead to new
technologies. Scientists thus defined their work as a long-term endeavour in
contrast to engineering, which they classified as a medium-term project aimed at
satisfying immediate need. In any case, the fact that researchers such as the chemist
Justus von Liebig felt it necessary to defend the scientific profession reflects the
growing pressure the scientific community faced from societal expectations in the
course of the 19th century:
Even the most powerful effect of science on the life and spirit of men is so
slow, noiseless, creeping and barely perceptible that a superficial observer
would be hard pressed to assess its impact. The expert, however, knows that
no real progress in this world is currently achieved without science and that
the accusation whereby it is not of public benefit preoccupies the general
public and not the men of science, who each in their own way, unwaveringly
follow their goals. Indeed, they remain untroubled about the future benefits of
their work since these accrue neither to them nor to an individual country but
to the whole of mankind. (Liebig 1862: 33, translation by DS)
Blurring Boundaries in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries: Scientists
in Transition
The fact that scientists felt compelled to do boundary work indicates that scientific
practice had already begun to change and that the hierarchical epistemic order no
longer applied across the board. It was the birth of engineering as an academic
discipline that set off this dynamic process of boundary work. By acquiring the right
to award doctorates in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the German technical
colleges enhanced their academic status (Ko¨nig 1999). Leading figures of this new
group of aspiring engineers such as Alois Riedler, a mechanical engineer and rector
of the Technische Universita¨t Berlin-Charlottenburg from 1899 to 1900, persistently
stressed that the relationship between science and technology was a two-way
process:
Technology has its natural share in the progress of the natural sciences; in
many areas technology has even run ahead of the natural sciences until deeper
scientific insights in turn paved the way for perfecting technical development;
… [T]hrough the magnificence of its tangible achievements, technology has
raised the public’s awareness of the natural sciences and has contributed
enormously to making science, in general, more popular. (Riedler 1900: 12,
translation by DS)
Conversely, scientists themselves began to overcome the gap between (pure)
science and technology. Related distinctions, for instance, between discovery and
invention were also blurring. Within the expanding field of the natural sciences in
the late 19th century, researchers had to transcend the limits of both established
disciplines and methods in order to find out something new. The development of
instruments became, more than ever before, an integral part of scientific work; the
act of designing new techniques became as relevant as discovering new elements or
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laws of nature. The instrumentality of science, not only in terms of its
methodological role of confirming theories but also in terms of its effectiveness,
had finally become part of the image of the truthfulness of science in the modern
world (Wilhelm Ostwald 1929: 21; Dear 2005: 404; Joerges and Shinn 2001).
Scientists such as the Nobel Prize winner and pioneer of physical chemistry
Wilhelm Ostwald campaigned for closer cooperation between scientists and
engineers. While criticizing the old supremacy of natural philosophy, he empha-
sized the similarities of scientific and technological endeavour, in particular a
systematic approach to research and to the desire to venture into the unknown
(Wilhelm Ostwald 1908: 20). As far as Ostwald was concerned, scientists and
engineers nonetheless differed in terms of their motivations (or goals) and their
temporal perspective; having discovered a new technology, engineers abandoned
scientific questioning, whereas scientists followed the path to its very end, hoping to
find definitive explanations to their questions. Although this notion of the
advancement of knowledge was less asymmetric than it had been a few decades
earlier, the emphasis Ostwald placed on science’s long-term orientation and the
continued ideal of human curiosity as a scientific value in itself demonstrated that a
sense of the moral superiority of science endured. (Wilhelm Ostwald 1905, 1911).
While the ideals of pure science were in the process of dissolving, by 1900, both
the institutional settings of research and research practices in the natural sciences
had already undergone significant change. The emergence of professional industrial
laboratories with salaried researchers (initially in the chemical and electrical
industry), the establishment of special research institutes outside of the universities
(both national laboratories in the service of the state and research centres for specific
research fields with mixed funding), the beginning of special funding programmes
for science, and the more extensive involvement of the administration in science
policy issues were some of the developments in science and in the attitudes within
society towards science observable in different countries.
Studies into German science emphasize that two new types of institutes, the
Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Association of German
Science) and the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft (Kaiser Wilhelm Society), concluded
an ongoing process of change in science at an institutional level that had come about
in response to the limitations of the former university-centred organization of
research and to the new expectations of industrialized mass society (Szo¨llo¨si-Janze
2005; Ash 2002: 35–38).6 The Kaiser Wilhelm Society, established in 1911 to
promote the natural sciences in Germany, was a reaction to the increased
requirements of disciplines such as chemistry and physics as well as a response to
increasing industrial demand for scientific knowledge and growing international
competition. With the financial support of both the state and influential entrepre-
neurs, scientists in the institutes on material research belonging to the Kaiser
Wilhelm Society were able to concentrate their entire efforts on research, that is
6 The history of both scientific organizations was the subject of two major research projects, which have
recently been concluded. See the wealth of research published in the academic series Beitra¨ge zur
Geschichte der deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, four volumes
published so far) and Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus (Go¨ttingen:
Wallstein Verlag, seventeen volumes published so far).
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‘‘pure science’’, without needing to undertake teaching duties. The Emergency
Association of German Science largely sponsored research projects at the
universities. This fund, derived from a variety of sources and governed by
academics, had been initiated by scientists after the First World War.
The funding programme Gemeinschaftsforschung (Collaborative Research),
which sought to further public health, the economy, and the greater public good,
together with the research areas pursued by several institutes belonging to the Kaiser
Wilhelm Society provide evidence that the pure-science ideal was becoming less
important. These self-governed academic institutions promoted research that
responded directly to industrial and political demands. Collaborative Research,
for example, financed projects which promised to either secure the production of
raw materials or develop substitute materials, to improve material processing or
technological development, and to increase food production.
To sum up the whole section, the historical overview from the 19th to the early
20th century shows that the pure-science ideal prevailed until the late 19th century
when the cooperation between university scientists and industry started to become
closer. The pure-science ideal was a legacy of the long-standing domination of
philosophy in academic culture. Having worked hard to earn the status of academic
disciplines, it was difficult for the natural sciences to overturn a notion of science
that strove for eternal truth while ignoring the technical and economic fruitfulness
of research. The fact that natural scientists continued to cling to the philosophical
tradition, however, became a point of conflict in the late nineteenth century because
the high social esteem enjoyed by the natural sciences was based primarily on their
significance for technological innovation and economic success. German science
had already begun to adjust to the new role of science in society on an institutional
level, the conceptual distinctions between pure and applied science and between
science and technology were set to blur in the early 20th century.
Science in the First Half of the 20th Century: Fundamental Research
and the Promise of Utility
The scientific purity discourses lost importance around 1900 and new terms began
to reshape the notion of science. This semantic shift suggests that the role of science
in society had already changed. The German composite noun Grundlagenforschung
(fundamental research),7 is a relatively young term that first emerged in the early
20th century within a very specific context in the discipline of mathematics (Dingler
1911: 35; Rulf 1913). In the late 19th century, mathematics underwent a disciplinary
realignment known as mathematical modernism (Mehrtens 1990). German math-
ematicians played a leading role in this scientific movement, the main goal of which
was disciplinary autonomy. The movement’s proponents created a special, self-
referential language by freeing the discipline from any metaphysical grounds and
7 In this article, I will consistently translate the German term Grundlagenforschung as ‘‘fundamental
research’’. Unlike the Anglo-American science discourse, the German science discourse does not
accommodate conceptual variations such as that between ‘‘basic research’’ and ‘‘fundamental research’’.
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providing mathematics with a theoretical framework that denied any reference to
reality or other concepts in science and technology and favoured instead an intrinsic,
formal logic. Journal articles such as ‘‘Mathematische Probleme’’ by David Hilbert
(1901) delineated a future research programme for mathematics revolving around
principal epistemic questions of proof. In summary, modern mathematicians created
a new epistemic foundation for their discipline.
Although the role of applied mathematics was an issue for dispute within this
reform movement, the term fundamental research was not actually used as an
antonym that contrasted to applied mathematics. Within the particular context of
mathematics, fundamental research denoted studies that contributed to solving
fundamental logical problems like those Hilbert had put on the agenda. Herbert
Mehrtens (1990: 149) thus classifies fundamental research as a specific subdisci-
pline (‘‘Spezialdisziplin’’) within mathematics. Because this specific meaning was
confined to mathematics, the term fundamental research first spread to adjacent
disciplines such as philosophy and, in particular, the philosophy of science (Lewin
1922). In fact, the German version of fundamental research was not common
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, and the few times the term emerged, it
referred mostly to fundamental epistemic questions within disciplines.
In contrast to the German scientific discourse, the English term ‘‘fundamental
research’’ emerged slightly earlier and, more importantly, within a different context
than in Germany. The English term basic research was initially less prevalent. Roger
Pielke has detected a New York Times article from 1919 in which ‘‘basic research’’
emerged in the context of a Congressional hearing on agricultural policy. According
to him, the concept was an offspring of the political discourse since its use was
restricted to the political arena until the late 1930s (Pielke 2012: 343). It must be
added that ‘‘fundamental’’ and ‘‘basic’’ were, among other things, used as attributes
to denote the core academic disciplines, such as physics, mathematics, or chemistry,
upon which other disciplines were founded. Thus, fundamental science and basic
science meant something completely different to fundamental research or basic
research in the English/American context.
The initial use of fundamental research in fields such as plant breeding and
technological or industrial research indicates that the term did not emerge from the
19th-century purity discourse. In the 1890s, scientists of agronomy at the American
land-grant colleges called for more fundamental research in general aspects of plant
physiology in order to continue making progress in plant breeding (Arthur 1895:
360). Problem- and application-oriented research led them to new questions that
‘‘pure’’ botany had not yet raised. The land-grant colleges were the result of a
federal initiative to foster education in agronomy and technology, and to offer
higher education to the wider public. As a result of their agricultural focus, these
colleges were provided with federally controlled land to establish agricultural
experiment stations. Similar to the German technical colleges, the land-grant
colleges were not originally on an equal footing with the universities in terms of
scientific prestige (Thelin 2004: 135–137). Yet researchers in these experimental
centres faced high public expectations to provide results that could improve farming
practices and increase crop yields (Marcus 1985).
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The demand for more fundamental research expounded one problem: the
uncertainty of scientific outcomes, even if a project had a clear task to fulfil right
from the start. Given this uncertainty, doing fundamental research meant at least
promising to lay a cornerstone for future technologies, new products, or new
materials. If research failed to produce new knowledge proving useful, scientists
could still legitimise their work via the ideal of pure science, that is the
advancement of knowledge as a value in itself. As any reference to the intrinsic
ideal of pure science was secondary, it served primarily as a back-up means of
legitimisation and only secondarily as a way to claim recognition for applied botany
among ‘‘pure’’ scientists. In the end, similar to the German example in engineering,
scientists in applied botany declared the distinction between pure and applied
science to be invalid: ‘‘All science is one. Pure science is often immensely practical,
applied science is often very pure science, and between the two there is no dividing
line’’ (Coulter 1917: 228). Applied botanists called upon science to remain open to
everyday needs and problems (Coulter 1919: 366). Alongside these examples from
botany, the term fundamental research can be found very early on in the context of
technological and industrial research. Fundamental research denoted any scientific
research revolving around basic technical problems with the goal of improving
existing technology or, hopefully, developing new technology (Nutting 1917: 250).
The fact that the concept of fundamental research arose in research fields with an
explicit application-orientation reveals that the new term was not a synonym for
pure science. Rather, it conveyed the promise that science would produce, sooner or
later, useful knowledge. This semantic shift was a response to the growing
expectations of science within society and the increasing number of possibilities that
scientific research had been able to offer in the development of technology and other
societal improvements since the late 19th century. However, researchers and
scientists phrased their promise of utility very cautiously; the metaphorical
meanings of ‘‘fundamental’’ express the idea that research is the first, but not the
only step in a complex process. Hence, the strategic use of the term can be described
as twofold: to promise utility and, at the same time, to confine expectations that may
be far too high.
With respect to British science policy in the first half of the 20th century, Sabine
Clarke (2010) has already pointed out that fundamental research did not emerge as a
synonym for pure science. She shows that in Britain, the new Department of
Scientific and Industrial Research, established in 1916, used the term first and
foremost to stimulate industrial research. The new ministry was supposed to
coordinate and support research that promised economic and social improvement.
At first, manufacturers and scientists scarcely welcomed the new grants offered by
the Department; according to Clarke, both parties wanted to avoid any kind of
governmental interference. Confronted by this industrial opposition, the Department
of Scientific and Industrial Research advertised long-term research projects dealing
with the basic properties of materials or with technical processes with the new term
‘‘fundamental research’’. In this particular context, the label pure science would
have evoked the image of curiosity-driven research without any practical end.
As Clarke demonstrates, the new term can only be understood within its specific
institutional and national setting; thus, we should not be too rash to conclude that the
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findings of the British study also apply to the German case. Furthermore, Robert
Kline’s older study (1995) on the boundary discourse of pure and applied science in
the US, which focuses on engineering and its relationship to the natural sciences,
suggests that, even in the English-speaking world, the meaning of the term
fundamental research varied greatly. According to Kline, the distinction between
‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘applied’’ had only become common in the 1870s, and so the ideal of
pure science was a relatively recent phenomenon in the US. Although the
demarcation between pure and applied science was becoming blurred in the interwar
period, Kline argues that the majority of researchers in engineering eventually
adopted the pure-science ideal in order to underscore their scientific capabilities and
their growing professional status. Kline’s main argument is that because engineering
was unable to assert an autonomous ideal of itself, technological knowledge
continued to be subordinated to scientific knowledge in the 20th century. For Kline
the new term fundamental research represented a modified ideal of pure science
which could also apply to technology. Where engineering is concerned, Kline
admits that he is unable to identify a clear strategy of autonomy forming an essential
aspect of the traditional notion of pure science.
Nazi Opposition to the Notion of Pure Science
In Germany, the term Grundlagenforschung only became common in the sciences
during the late 1930s. Its meanings certainly deviated from the original use of the
concept within the context of German mathematics, as well as from the old semantics
of pure science. After the scientific purity discourse ran out of steam in the 1920s, the
National Socialist German University Lecturers’ League (Nationalsozialistischer
Deutscher Dozentenbund), which represented the younger generation of lecturers
attempting to bring the universities into line with Nazi ideology in particular, fought
against the institutional, epistemic, and normative concepts that characterised the
ideals of pure science (Nagel 2008). The Nazi discourse denounced the 19th-century
humanistic notion of academia as a liberal bourgeois ideal that had permanently
estranged science and scholarship from the German people.
On a detailed scale, the Nazi discourse criticized the older concept of science as
being a selfish project pursued by scientists. This criticism was levelled at the
epistemic norm of objective neutrality and the assumption that the natural sciences
were unconditional – in particular in terms of the choice of research subjects – thus
exposing the notion of pure science as a concept contrived by the ivory tower.
Furthermore, Nazi critics blamed the self-referential concept of pure science for
causing institutional fragmentation and disciplinary differentiation in science.
Continuing the Weimar policy of collaborative research, the Nazi scientific ideal
entailed joint efforts by researchers from different institutional and disciplinary
backgrounds aimed at solving the problems of the day; problems that were, of
course, defined by the politics of the Nazi regime. It is no surprise that the Nazi
counter-concept of science quite openly called for a politicization of the academic
world – in particular with regard to staff and research policy – and reinterpreted the
ideals of universalism, academic freedom, and unity of science in light of the
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Volksgemeinschaft ideology (the ideology of the community of German people):
academic universalism transformed into social universalism, which sought to
overcome individual, institutional, and disciplinary interests. The political inter-
pretation of freedom meant that science was in a position to contribute to the
German people’s independence from foreign raw materials, in accordance with the
Nazi quest for autarky. And lastly, by invoking the older ideal of the unity of
science, they legitimized collaborative science, its different disciplines, and its
various institutions in order to fulfil national tasks (Henkel 1933; Krieck 1933; Lo¨hr
1938; W. Schultze 1938).
Research in Nazi Germany: Between Four-Year Plans and Long-Term Science
Policy
In light of the official campaign against the old pure-science ideal at the beginning
of the Nazi regime, the use of fundamental research in the late 1930s can hardly be
understood as a new version of pure science presenting the search for knowledge of
nature and truth both as an a priori goal of research and a value in itself. The terms
Grundlagenforschung and Zweckforschung (goal-oriented research) gained hold as
political efforts to acquire control over academic and industrial research increased.
In 1937, the Nazi regime established a research council, the Reichsforschungsrat
(Reich Research Council), which was responsible for funding research. During the
war, the Research Council was directly responsible to the Army Ordnance Office
(Flachowsky 2008: 232–462).
The Research Council’s first president, military general and professor of army
technology Karl Becker, defined fundamental research as science that could not be
‘‘commanded and accelerated’’. He guaranteed, therefore, that ‘‘as far as researchers
and facilities in the institutions [for fundamental research] in question offer even
some guarantee of success’’, there would be no interference from the Research
Council (Becker 1937: 26). Becker made particular mention of the various
institutions for aeronautical research and the institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Society, promising to abstain from exerting any control over these institutions in
light of their close relationships to industry. Goal-oriented research, which was
meant to be built on fundamental research, was to fit into the schedule of the four-
year plan. In this context, goal-oriented research denoted first and foremost
industrial research leading to the development of advanced technology. Against the
backdrop of the four-year plan, the Nazi regime demanded that industry give
complete insight into its research activities (Becker 1937: 25, 27).
In 1940, the Illustrierte Zeitung, a well-established illustrated magazine
published in Leipzig, devoted an entire issue to the topic of German research in
the service of the people in order to present Nazi science policy. The magazine
included articles from leading scientists such as the biochemist and Noble Prize
winner Adolf Butenandt, journalists specializing in scientific topics such as Hans
Hartmann8, and ministry officials (No. 4956, 22 August 1940). To some extent, the
8 Trained as a theologian, Hans Hartmann worked as an author specializing in writing about scientists
and science policy issues.
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issue was a response to continuing foreign criticism of the way the Nazis had
incorporated German academia into National Socialism (Rust 1940; Hartmann
1940). Completely ignoring criticism of racist staffing policy, the articles presented
a concept of science that responded to the needs of society without compromising
scientists’ research freedom. ‘‘The freedom of research would not be endangered
when the state ensures that state-funded institutes are given the task of conducting
fundamental research in order to solve problems within the national economy’’
(Krauch 1940: 122, translated by DS).
The articles, however, also addressed German scientists on the question of how a
more utility-oriented research affected its institutional setting. The issue of
organizing science in order to quickly achieve societal and technological progress
without duplicating efforts in both academic and industrial research had already
been under discussion within the paradigm of rationalisation prior to the Nazi’s
seizure of power. From the late 19th century onwards, industry conducted more and
more research in its own laboratories, and the good salaries attracted talented
researchers. The future role of universities as training and research institutions and
the initial division of labour between academic and industrial research thus became
a vital question of science policy. Furthermore, the changing research practices also
led to an organizational discussion about individual or team research. The terms
fundamental research and goal-oriented research were part of these ongoing
negotiations (Krauch 1941: 2; Bru¨che 1944: 114–115; Stadlinger 1944: 227, 229;
Verein Deutscher Chemiker 1943; Drescher-Kaden 1941: 10, 16–17).
Overall, the articles in this special issue sought mainly to demonstrate to the
public how German scientists, whose work was less visible, contributed to the
nation during war time. Authors such as Butenandt tried to explain their ongoing
experimental work in terms of both its meaning for society and its potential impact
to a wider lay audience (Butenandt 1940). Following the initial hostility
demonstrated by Nazi ideology towards the academic elite and elitist institutions
such as the academies of sciences, this issue of the Illustrierte Zeitung promoted
science wholesale by emphasizing that it was necessary for society to support
research.
Within the natural sciences up to 1939, the new term ‘‘fundamental research’’
was rarely used and did not yet have an established, fixed set of meanings. In
physics, for example, fundamental research could denote theoretical physics or,
alternatively, it referred to the older distinction between the natural sciences and
technology (Reichenba¨cher 1937: 285; Hiedemann 1939: V, 1). Despite this
semantic variation, the strategic uses of the new term in most of the disciplines bore
some resemblance to one another when it came down to combining the term with
goal-oriented research. It is striking that as the term fundamental research became
more widespread after 1939, scientists tended to mention Grundlagenforschung and
Zweckforschung in the same breath (Witzell 1944: 212–217). In fact, the term
fundamental research emerged in the natural and technical sciences mainly when
the individual field of research was close to application or demonstrated promise for
military, economic, and political aims. This was the case, for instance, with
innovations in weaponry and military strategy, maintaining public health, ensuring
food supply, rationalizing the production and use of raw materials, inventing
290 D. Schauz
123
substitute materials, and encouraging industrial production. In the humanities, the
term fundamental research was still less common. This observation leads us to the
question of whether the use of the two terms really worked as a boundary discourse.
Interdisciplinary research fields, such as forestry, represented a utility-oriented
notion of science in the first place. In the case of forestry, research promised more
profitable cultivation and effective technical treatment of the raw material wood.
Germany’s rise as a colonial power in the late nineteenth century had already
transformed forestry into a politically and economically significant discipline,
fostered since by the German state. In the Nazi war economy, the issue of raw
materials, and with it the supply of wood, gained even greater importance (Steinsiek
2008). In this disciplinary context, fundamental research and goal-oriented research
represented two equivalent sub-areas of forestry: one that studied the nature of the
substance wood, and one that analyzed its material properties and the effects of
technical treatment. The overall goal of both research fields was to acquire
knowledge about the optimal use for the raw material wood (Runkel 1942:
305–306).9
The majority of scientists defined fundamental research as pursuing fundamental
questions of nature, its substances, and its processes. This contrast to goal-oriented
research still adhered to the old demarcation between nature, on the one hand, and
society and its relationship to natural resources, on the other. But questions about
nature, labelled by scientists as fundamental research in the late 1930s and 1940s,
arose within the context of technical and practical problems (Kaiser Wilhelm-
Gesellschaft zur Fo¨rderung der Wissenschaften 1939: 322; Hoffmann and Suhr
1944: 550), that is in applied science disciplines such as aeronautics, armament,
forestry, plant breeding, and nutrition.
In the majority of cases, scientists simply stressed the necessity of both
fundamental research and goal-oriented research, in other words, the general
necessity of research for any kind of progress. This is where the views of the
scientific community converged with the goals of Nazi economic policymakers,
who were aware that the US and British governments were providing massive
support to research for economic and military purposes (Krauch 1939). When it
came to clearly defining terminology in this period, scientists surprisingly described
fundamental research as the study of nature, devoid of any concrete notion of how it
might be applied in terms of technology or societal utility. Yet having just drawn a
distinction between utility-oriented research and research driven simply by the urge
for knowledge, scientists immediately strove to emphasize that limiting fundamen-
tal research was not possible in terms of research practice and its institutional
settings, whether in industry, in universities, or in other research institutions
(Bauermeister 1938; Wolfgang Ostwald 1942: 130–131; Niemeier 1944: 106–107).
Moreover, the distinction between fundamental research and goal-oriented research
was often criticized as misleading because it suggested that fundamental research
9 In other disciplinary contexts, the study of material properties was also denoted as goal-oriented
research (Bauermeister 1938: 479).
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was far removed from any notion of useful application (Zenneck 1944: 10; Endell
1942: 113; Wolfgang Ostwald 1942: 130–131).
These definitions must be seen as a vestige of patterns characterizing scientists’
former understanding of science. However, one question remains unanswered: if
this differentiation of research types appeared to have little consequence for the
scientific community, why did scientists introduce new terminology that could be
understood as part of a dichotomy and that, moreover, was reminiscent of former
boundary discourses? As the use of the term fundamental research was prevalent in
engineering as well as in those research fields in chemistry, physics, biology, and
geography that responded, in particular, to the concrete needs of the economy and
the political regime, the intention was hardly to reactivate either the old demarcation
between science and technology or the ideal of science for its own sake. The fact
that new terms emerged reveals two things. Firstly, under the Nazi regime the
scientific community felt the need to renegotiate the conditions under which science
and research were conducted. Secondly, the old concepts of science no longer fit
with existing practices in science.
The term fundamental research was fresh; Zweckforschung, which was highly
unusual in the natural sciences until the mid 1930s, was even more so.10 In fact, the
latter only gained importance during the Nazi period. Some scientists explicitly
considered goal-oriented research as a temporary focus of science responding to a
situation of national emergency. In 1936, the chemist Wolfgang Ostwald, son of
Wilhelm Ostwald and former president of the Kolloid-Gesellschaft (Colloid
Society), stated that ‘‘[o]ver the last years, much has been said about so-called
‘Zweckforschung’. It means the entirety of efforts to draw more extensively than
usual on scientific research for solving major economic problems’’ (Kolloid-
Gesellschaft 1936: 159, translation by DS). To be precise, the term goal-oriented
research was spreading at the very same time that the creation of the new
government administration in 1937, the Reich Research Council, institutionalised
the four-year plan. This new authority and the second four-year plan that ensued
broadened the field of activities in which science henceforth was understood as an
important prerequisite for economic progress. Thus, in contrast to free research,
goal-oriented research meant target-oriented research according to the goals of the
four-year plan (Bache´r 1937; Willing 1937).11
In order to explain the emergence of this new scientific nomenclature, it is most
revealing to look at the chronology governing the spread of new terms. With the
foundation of the new Reich Research Council (1937), which claimed to bring
German research efficiently into line with Nazi policies, some scientists were
concerned about the future funding of fundamental research (Bauermeister 1938:
476). It would be misleading to interpret this plea for fundamental research as a
10 In the natural sciences during this period, the term only appeared in a very specific context. In the
1920s, a group of biologists and psychologists discussed the question of the functional usefulness of
organs or mental processes within organisms, an approach they also labelled as Zweckforschung (E.
Becher 1921: 296–304; H. Becher 1923).
11 It took a while before the new term Zweckforschung (goal-oriented research) was established.
Confusingly, some Nazi partisans used the term goal-oriented research as a synonym for pure science,
criticizing the idea of research as an end in itself (W. Schultze 1938: 5; Lo¨hr 1938: 20).
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struggle for freedom of science that ignored the expectations of society in favour of
absolute professional independence; the concerns expressed do not reveal an
objection to the idea that science should serve political aims or national tasks. Yet
the scientists’ worries certainly revolved around the question of how to govern
science. The concern was, in fact, that scientific knowledge as a resource for
innovation might dwindle in the long run. It can be described as an argument of
knowledge sustainability meaning that knowledge will run short if scientists and
policymakers align knowledge production exclusively with immediate needs.
Within this sustainability discourse, fundamental research represented the experi-
ences that, firstly, scientific progress was often unexpected and, secondly, that even
the research output that sought practical solutions was unpredictable and needed
time before its application was possible. According to these researchers, science had
to conquer new ground deemed necessary for the long-term advancement of
technology. Only a few scientists actually recognized the semantic shift in scientific
nomenclature and criticized the new term fundamental research for constraining
science to technological ends (Richter 1943: 207).
The reference to the long-term and unpredictable nature of scientific research
was, of course, not new. Back in the 19th century, this had already served as an
argument in the science-technology boundary discourse. Yet it was not until the
20th century that this aspect of scientific and technological progress became an
everyday experience in many fields of research. The problem of how to find the
right balance between venturing into the unknown and, at the same time, abiding by
a research policy that sought to keep the aims of research in its sights had been
under discussion in the 1920s, in particular within the context of industrial research.
Faced by the Nazi Regime’s four-year plan and the increasing pressure of the
expectations on science during the war, it became even more important for
researchers to communicate to the regime that their work contributed to political
aims, even if they were unable to guarantee any immediate success.
The argument that research had its own temporal logic was also present in
research fields devoid of a science-technology nexus. In 1943, Joachim H. Schultze,
professor of geography in Jena, expressed the belief that science ought to be one
step ahead of the demands of the day. He defined fundamental research as ‘‘general
research regardless of its practical application and regardless of the benefits of
everyday life’’ (J. H. Schultze 1943: 197). He described research in geography as the
task of depicting the overall research areas in the discipline, which included topics
as diverse as the earth’s surface, landscapes, and the cultural and demographic
depiction of countries. The central aim of Schultze’s article was not, however, to
protect a self-referential concept of science, but rather to praise the utility of
geography in general as well as the research carried out thus far for the purpose of
warfare. Referring to historical examples of the huge political and economic interest
in geography, Schultze argued that science, rather than being left to its own devices,
needed both a societal mission and interest from the public. He advocated the idea
of a central German geographical institute which would carry out fundamental and
goal-oriented research for the state and for economic purposes. Schultze called for
the combination of fundamental and goal-oriented research for an epistemic reason:
research needs time and the future utility of scientific outcomes is not foreseeable as
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readily as future societal needs (J. H. Schultze 1943: 201). Thus, the term
fundamental research stood for sustainable knowledge with potential benefit, or a
sort of stock of knowledge (Ziegelmayer 1936: 253; Stock 1938: 150–151; Bru¨che
1944: 113).
The Discursive Strategy of Fundamental Research and the Reassessment
of German Science in the Nazi Period
Over the last decade, German science and its research endeavours under National
Socialism have undergone a historical re-evaluation, namely within two major
projects on the history of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation). The focus has
shifted to some extent from the effects of Nazi ideology and the participation of the
humanities, anthropology, and medicine in racist and eugenic policies, to the hard
and technical sciences that contributed to the military and economic goals of the
Nazi regime. Whereas former studies stressed the negative effects of Nazi science
policy, such as, the international isolation of the German scientific community, the
experience of being cut off from raw materials required by the experimental
sciences and the focus on substitute research as a result of a policy of autarky, and,
since 1933, the incredible loss of excellent researchers as a result of racist science
policy, recent studies present a more differentiated picture of science under the Nazi
regime when focusing on research output and technical innovation.
Despite the regulatory claims of the Reich Research Council and the German
Research Foundation’s loss of autonomy, recent studies show that researchers were
still able to shape research policy according to their own interests. Provided that
researchers showed a political affinity to the Nazi regime, scientific reputation and
peer review continued to define the allocation of research funding (Flachowsky
2010). In particular after 1942, the year in which the Reich Research Council was
reorganized and military technical equipment assumed greater importance in the
German war effort, it appears that the regulatory claims of German research policy
finally gave way to a more efficiency-oriented policy. As Mitchell Ash puts it,
normal science existed throughout the Nazi period (Ash 2006: 34–35).
In this reassessment of German science and scholarship, the question of whether
Nazi science policy led to a shift in focus from Grundlagenforschung (fundamental
research) to angewandte Forschung (applied research) plays a crucial role. Recent
studies provide evidence that fundamental research and applied research did not
work as clearly demarcated, transdisciplinary, and supertemporal categories.
Current studies on the history of the natural sciences during the Nazi period attest
to a continuity of – what they call – fundamental research. Some studies suggest that
German professors adjusted to the new conditions by combining applied research
that accorded to political and economic requirements with fundamental research
that earned greater appreciation within the scientific community in their projects.
Although full professors apparently still honoured the ideal of pure science, most of
them had contact with industry as individual consultants and/or via collaboration.
Other studies identify fundamental research in especially applied contexts such as
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armament and defence research, but also in economically promising research fields
such as metals research and polymer chemistry (Luxbacher 2010; Erker 2010;
Flachowsky 2010; Epple 2002: 318–322). In the case of metals research, Gu¨nter
Luxbach differentiates between research on the composition of metal, which was
labelled as fundamental research, and research that tested the technical properties of
metals, which was known as applied research. In contrast to this classical distinction
between the quest for knowledge of nature and the quest for technological progress,
Paul Erker describes polymer chemistry as a discipline that strove to combine these
two motives. Erker employs the label of basic research for a heterogeneous and
innovative research policy. Thus the meaning of fundamental research differs in
historical studies on the natural sciences, not least because these studies investigate
different disciplines.
By countering older historical interpretations that see German science in decline
since its political instrumentalization in 1933, the main thrust of these recent
contributions is, of course, that the Nazi’s war and policy of autonomy did not cause
the profile of academic research to change overall. The insight that fundamental
research went hand-in-hand with goal-oriented research is a novelty only if we
analyse science on the premise that basic and applied research constitute two
fundamentally different forms of research. Most of the historians quoted above still
do not question the distinction between basic and applied research. The long-
established categories still appear to be so self-evident that these authors do not feel
obliged to define them explicitly for the specific research fields upon which they
focus. Moreover, most of them still fail to reflect on how scientists employed terms
such as Grundlagenforschung and Zweckforschung during the Nazi period.
Only a few of these historians have reconsidered their analytic vocabulary in
light of new evaluations of the Nazi period. Moritz Epple, for instance, no longer
believes in the opposition of the terms basic and applied. As in recent propositions
in the philosophy of science, he suggests that we should speak of application-
oriented fundamental research within the context of Nazi science (Epple 2010: 213).
Another interpretation suggests that as German professors were increasingly
involved in applied research, the use of the term fundamental research was merely
symbolic, for the purpose of scientific reputation (Wagner 2010: 26–27, 33).
Surprisingly, semantic sensibility is on the rise when it comes to discussing the
aftermath of the Second World War. Within this context, the use of the term
fundamental research is more often identified as a simply rhetorical strategy
deployed by German scientists in order to retrospectively downplay their
involvement in the Nazi system. Carola Sachse argues that this strategy of moral
relief also worked in the American context: it was supposed to dispel fear of
German post-war science (Sachse 2010: 480).
So far, this analysis of the first half of the 20th century has shown that the new
terms fundamental and basic research initially emerged in mission-oriented or
technical research fields. In Germany the concept only gained importance since the
1930s when research had to meet high political expectations. With regard to the
historical context of the Nazi regime, the results suggest that the interpretation of a
simply rhetorical strategy, whether as a strategy of individual moral relief or as a
professional strategy for protecting a scientist’s guaranteed freedoms, is not entirely
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convincing. Because many German scientists demonstrated their commitment to the
Nazi regime by offering their research services, the terms fundamental research did
not serve to protect the old intrinsic ideal of science. In a period when the political
expectations placed on science were high, the terms expounded instead the
experience that scientific progress and procedures leading to exploitable results
were difficult to predict.
From Knowledge Sustainability to Purity Discourse: US Science Policy
Between the Second World War and the Cold War Period
As the rise of basic research as a pivotal keyword in science policy during the post-
war era was not peculiar to Germany, it is now time for a more comparative
perspective. Although the two terms fundamental and basic research had gained
greater currency throughout the 1930s in US science and, more generally, in science
throughout the English-speaking world than had the term Grundlagenforschung in
German science, they had not yet spilled over into all the different disciplines.12
Analysis of the journal Science demonstrates that, at that time, the use of these terms
was still limited to biology (agriculture as well as studies on vitamins and proteins,
which attracted pharmaceutical companies, also employed these terms), industrial
research, and engineering. Once again, the terms denoted long-term studies focusing
on fundamental problems in biology, chemistry, or physics emerging within the
context of technical and application-related questions. The term fundamental
research did not constitute an antonym to applied research; it was not part of a
boundary discourse. In 1942, the research administrator of the US Department of
Agriculture described basic research as follows:
In all these cases, either basic research precedes the practical applications of
science, or a certain amount of this kind of research is found to be necessary
somewhere along the line to clear-up obscurities that block further progress.
… the point I am making is that in research there is no single road to practical
results. If we keep our eyes constantly and exclusively on what seem to be
immediate needs, we miss some of the richest fruits of scientific work – the
fruits that grow from the discovery of important fundamental facts. … The
emphasis I have given to basic research and freedom of inquiry does not mean
that we should pay any less attention than we do to homely experimentation
directed toward solving everyday problems. (Auchter 1942: 287, 288)
In the case of engineering, the concept of fundamental research largely represented
the ongoing process of the scientification of technology (Gibb 1937: 233–234;
Jewett 1944). Institutes such as the Mellon Institute of Industrial Research at the
12 In order to get a better idea of conceptual dissemination, I provide here some results of a statistical
analysis of the electronically accessible journal Science (including the supplement The Scientific
Monthly). Between 1921 and 1930, the term basic research was used 14 times and fundamental research
was used 121 times. Between 1931 and 1940, the term basic research showed up 51 times and
fundamental research 154 times. Just five years later, the term basic research had been employed 69 times
and fundamental research 182 times.
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University of Philadelphia, which defined itself as a link between science and
technology (or in the words of Edward Weidlein ‘‘between the world of science and
the industry’’), used the term fundamental research as a general label for their
projects and training (Weidlein 1935: 562).
In light of these examples, the argument that the new concepts reflected the
increasing expectation that science should be beneficial to the economy and to
society as a whole also applies to the US case. Scientists were aware of the
epistemic and institutional challenges to research that the 20th century brought
forth. As a result of the increasing commercial potential of fundamental research,
patents became a major issue at US universities quite early on. In contrast to the
German universities, where the right to hold patents appeared to be considered part
of the individual academic freedom of German professors (at least until the rise of
the Nazi reign),13 the American land-grant colleges introduced patent regulations as
early as the 1920s. Nevertheless, the administrative, legal, and ethical problems of
patenting within institutions of higher education remained a controversial issue over
the next few years (Potter 1940).
After dealing bit-by-bit with the shifting situation of science in the early 20th
century, the Second World War marked an incisive and formative experience for the
scientific community. When the US entered the war, the national mobilisation of
science acquired the same level of importance there as in the other warring
countries. In the early 1940s, the US debate on the effects of wartime revolved first
and foremost around financial redistribution in science. The US universities, which
depended mostly on private donations, were considered to be the losers in this
process. In 1941, the long-standing idea of a federal fund that aimed to guarantee
research funding on a regular and permanent basis was reignited. Although the
financial crisis of the American universities had begun earlier during the Great
Depression and bore several failed attempts to secure federal support for academic
research (K. T. Compton 1934; Geiger 1986: 246–255), proponents of this initiative
blamed the war for worsening the financial situation of the universities and
diagnosed a crisis in fundamental research (Blakeslee 1941).
Those advocating federal support argued that a new form of funding was
necessary because research in the basic sciences, that is in basic disciplines such as
physics or chemistry, laid the indispensable foundation for future benefits: ‘‘We are
all familiar with the material conveniences and comforts which science has given
us, but we often forget the original patient, fundamental research which made them
possible and will be the basis for future advances’’ (Robbins 1941: 8). As the
concept of fundamental research had thus far denoted only research with a clear
reference to application, the novelty here was the fact that the supporters of such a
fund classified the entire endeavour of academic research at universities as
fundamental research. Moreover, the lack of financial support for the universities
was in opposition to the better funding of industrial and governmental research,
which was only supposed to favour research that could demonstrate the prospect of
immediate benefits (Robbins 1941).
13 See, for instance, the decision of the Senate of the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich in the
early 1920s (Archive of the University, Sen. 523).
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From Wartime to Peacetime: Vannevar Bush’s Plans for Transforming Science
Policy
During the war, scientists had discussed the future conditions of science (Science
1942). At the end of the war, plans for a new science policy were already on the
table. In the literature on research and development policy, funding for basic
research and the dissociative model of basic and applied research in the post-war era
are still inseparably linked to the name Vannevar Bush (Braun-Thu¨rmann et al.
2010: 17). The MIT professor for electrical engineering served as presidential
science adviser and, in particular, as chairman of the National Defense Research
Committee and director of its successor organization, the Office of Scientific
Research and Development. While coordinating the American military research
programmes, including the Manhattan Project (the project devoted to constructing
the atomic bomb), he began to make plans for a federal peacetime science policy.
Based on the negotiations of four scientific committees (a Medical Advisory
Committee, a Committee on Science and the Public Welfare, a Committee on
Discovery and Development of Scientific Talent, and a Committee on Publication of
scientific Information), in July 1945, Bush presented guidelines for future
governmental promotion of scientific activity in the natural sciences and in
medicine to the public. As well as providing financial support for academic research
and junior scientists in the natural sciences, the proposals encompassed a reform of
patent law and tax incentives for industrial research, the promotion of medical
research, the plea for open science by fostering international exchange and
strategies of declassification, and, finally, the sponsorship of basic research on
military matters. Bush’s report ‘‘Science—The Endless Frontier’’ essentially sought
to institutionalize federal science policy on a permanent basis (Bush 1945).
We should interpret his draft against the background of the war experience. The
Second World War had demonstrated, once again, the importance of research for
society and the fast-growing need for scientific knowledge. During the war,
scientists and engineers had found that the search for technical innovation in the
service of national defence spawned new questions and new problems for the
natural sciences, the implication of which was long-term research. Given the
immense expectations concerning immediate results within the context of warfare,
some scientists feared that researchers would no longer be able to meet the demand
of new knowledge for technical development (Simons 1943: 391). Despite the
achievements made during the war, researchers warned of an exhaustion and future
shortage of scientific knowledge: only by exploiting existing knowledge, they
claimed, had it been possible to invent penicillin and radar, two of research’s major
wartime success stories. In other words, there was a fear that the equilibrium
between the production of scientific knowledge and its application would be
disturbed (Bush 1945: 5, 8). The argument of knowledge sustainability thus became
also important within the US community of scientists facing the war-time conditions
of research.
This scarcity anxiety also applied to personnel resources in science (Barton and
Burnham 1943: 176; H. S. Taylor 1944: 250). Bush’s report criticized the fact that,
due to radical recruitment practices, the shortage of scientific personnel in the US
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was greater than in other countries (Bush 1945: 19). Bush’s colleagues, such as the
Nobel Prize winner Arthur H. Compton, believed that the training situation and the
support afforded to fundamental research14 at the universities were even worse in
the US than in Germany (A. H. Compton 1945: 208). A lack of scientifically trained
researchers also posed a problem for science-based industry. Thus the four
committees suggested programmes for fostering scientific talent that included the
generation in uniform returning from the war, particularly through doctoral
fellowships for basic research.
In spite of this crisis and the discourse of epistemic and personnel shortage,
wartime research efforts had, after all, strengthened the position of science in
society. As the US government had spent more money on science throughout the
course of the Second World War than ever before (Bush 1945: 82), scientists had a
particular interest in perpetuating this federal commitment to science in peacetime.
Since the US were traditionally characterized by less state intervention and a
scientific infrastructure based largely on philanthropy and private donations, the
federal support for academic research and training had been much lower than in
Germany or in other European countries. It thus became necessary to legitimize the
regular government funding envisioned through science’s role in the overall welfare
of the nation. The Bush report justified the government’s obligation to support basic
research in three ways. Firstly, medical research would improve public health.
Secondly, research would advance the overall public welfare, which was almost
synonymous with economic growth and job security due to innovations and new
products. And finally, long-term civilian research promised to give the US a
technological edge in armaments which was supposed to guarantee national
security. Only then did basic research become a real keyword in research funding.
And the metaphor of ‘‘basic’’ did the trick; by laying the basics for all kinds of
future benefits, the federal government financed basic research as for the common
good.
Bush’s proposal also reacted to the organizational conditions of wartime
research, in particular with regard to security restrictions. The problem of secrecy
policy had already been discussed openly during the war (K. T. Compton 1942: 28).
Bush’s report called for the prompt release of classified research after the war. This
request also involved a secrecy strategy in which projects were split up into small,
isolated research groups, each of which worked on a specialised problem without
the opportunity for any kind of exchange between them.15 It is worth mentioning
that the work on these specialized problems within isolated research groups was
sometimes denoted as fundamental or basic research during the war (Simons 1943:
392), which indicates that Bush’s use of the term deviated from the former
understanding. In order to near the ideal of open science once again, Bush believed
that the federal government was also obliged to encourage publication, international
communication, and cooperation following the war. In general, the report restricted
14 Bush consistently referred to ‘‘basic research’’ in his report. At the time, however, the term
‘‘fundamental research’’ was more widespread.
15 As the broader research context was hidden to scientific peers and to the researchers themselves, this
strategy at least allowed the publication of detailed results.
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the role of federal science policy to financial support and the provision of
coordinating infrastructure (Bush 1945: 22–24). Bush sought to prevent the
government and the military from continuing to pursue the managerial approach to
science policy they had applied in wartime. Bush criticized the military leadership
for being too narrow-minded, a characteristic that did not fit with his understanding
of the speculative and multidimensional nature of research (Reingold 1987:
338–341). Failed attempts to establish federal research funding had already
demonstrated that the majority of the scientific community disapproved of any
governmental intervention in science (Geiger 1986: 255).
Other scientists shared with Bush the rising concerns over free scientific
exchange toward the end of the war (H. S. Taylor 1944: 255; Jewett 1944: 3), but
Bush’s report was the first to link the relatively new notion of basic research with an
institutional guarantee of scientific autonomy in such a close fashion. This also
included his contrasting juxtaposition of basic research with applied research and
development. By then, applied research had not been an antonym to basic research.
Basic research thus not only meant that science should be freed from the burden of
high expectations tied to immediately exploitable results; it also entailed the
freedom of both inquiry and scientific communication. The different agendas and
arguments – the strengthening of US universities as research and training
institutions, the switch from war to peace, and attracting federal support for science
in the name of national welfare – converged in the report’s recommendation to
enhance the universities and non-profit research institutions as centres of basic
research.
Following the release of the report, US scientists, politicians, and industry
representatives entered into controversial discussions on various aspects of Bush’s
proposals, which delayed the establishment of the National Science Foundation for
nearly five years. The patent issue, the suggestion that the social sciences be
excluded from federal support, the uneven distribution of excellent research
universities in the individual states coupled with the corresponding problem of how
to fairly allocate federal funding, and, finally, the envisioned scientific expertocracy
within the federal foundation proved to be particularly delicate subjects. Bush’s
proposal faced opposition, in particular from the military, liberal and democrat
activists, and even from scientific colleagues. At the universities, which stood to
benefit most from the funding, some scientists considered the plea for basic research
as restricting their funding and research habits, which included contract research for
industry or the army. There is no need to go into the details of this debate here since
a mass of literature has already revealed these conflicting institutional interests and
the political dimension of the controversy on science policy in the early years
following the Second World War (Kevles 1977; Reingold 1987; Owens 1994;
Zachary 1997: 218–239, 249–260; Guston 2000; Dennis 2004). Most interpretations
allude to Bush’s political conservatism aiming at the restoration of the pre-war
political order. More generally speaking, studies on post-war research policy have
so far presented a mainly political reading of these debates, which essentially
revolved around the issue of more or of less intervention of the federal government
into research. Even Roger Pielke’s (2012) current interpretation confines the
concept basic research to this political dimension: in his view, the symbolic capacity
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of the term accommodated the conflicting parties, striving for the organization of
science by the federal government on the one side and the autonomous organization
of research by scientists on the other side, by promising potential utility.
What this analysis can add to the previous literature is a more nuanced
interpretation of the conflicts within the scientific community. I argue that the
scientific controversy over Bush’s ‘‘Endless frontier’’ partly stemmed from
differences or even misunderstandings in the semantics of basic research. Although
Bush developed the concept from the common discourse on knowledge sustain-
ability, he added new semantic dimensions that had to meet multiple requirements
of a new funding programme. In what follows, I demonstrate how the various
problems in research organization and the overall political climate during the Cold-
War period were turning this sustainability discourse by and by into a purity
discourse.
Bush’s Definition of Basic Research: The Beginning of a History
of Misconceptions?
Bush’s report marked a semantic shift in basic research that made a clear break with
existing practices and notions in order to reorganize research in the post-war period.
His specific use of the concept of basic research thus gave rise to misunderstandings
and confusion. Moreover, the history of basic research in the second half of the 20th
century has been characterized, in part, by these misunderstandings, which in the
long run evoked anachronisms over which science and technology studies are still
puzzling today. Bush’s short definition of basic research as ‘‘research performed
without thought of practical ends’’ (Bush 1945: 13), still singled out by most studies
(Stokes 1997: 116; Godin 2005b: 265; Popp Berman 2012: 21), definitely
contradicted the original understanding of basic/fundamental research in the context
of application. Even more so, this reduction fails to represent the conceptual range
of basic research in the report and the wider debates that took place right after the
war.
Bush’s definitions of research, science, and applied science confused his peers
and even one of his closest companions James Conant, who reflected critically on
the new conceptual boundaries (Conant 1948). Representatives of national or
military laboratories felt particularly compelled to argue against an institutional
separation of basic and applied research. A member of the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory, for instance, argued that ‘‘the naval laboratory programmes make it
necessary for us to carry on basic research in certain parts of certain fields simply
because no other agency is interested in, or has the facilities for, doing this work’’
(Bennett 1946). Bush’s peers in engineering were certainly confused by the different
ways of denoting basic research. Universities specializing in the applied sciences
and engineering, such as the California Institute of Technology (Caltech),
understood basic research – inseparable from the overall pragmatic goal of
inventing new technology – as an integral part of modern engineering (DuBridge
1959: 109–110).
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Following the publication of ‘‘Endless frontier’’, scientists and other policymak-
ers tried to differentiate and redefine the concept of basic research, which indicates
that Bush’s understanding of basic research was not taken for granted and that
researchers struggled with it because it did not fit the existing research landscape.
John Steelman, science adviser to President Truman, for instance, divided basic
research into two subcategories: firstly, fundamental research defined as ‘‘theoretical
analysis … directed to the extension of knowledge of the general principles
governing natural or social phenomena’’, and secondly, ‘‘background research’’
defined as ‘‘systematic observation, collection, organization, and presentation of
facts using known principles to reach objectives that are clearly defined before the
research is undertaken to provide a foundation for subsequent research’’ (Steelman
1947a: 6). Others tried to introduce a distinction between ‘‘fundamental research,
which leads to an understanding of the laws of nature, the discovery of new facts
and laws, and the theoretical development’’, and ‘‘basic research as it applies to
industrial or military development involving basic studies of the fruits of
fundamental work to determine their potentialities antecedent to application’’
(Leob 1946: 540). An industrial researcher defined basic research as an intermediate
category, which he located between pure research as ‘‘inquiry after knowledge for
its own sake’’ and applied research as ‘‘the investigation carried out in response to
immediate, direct, and obvious needs’’ (Spaght 1955: 785). The gradual emergence
of new variations such as ‘‘mission-oriented basic research’’ indicates, at least, that
the criterion of intention, whether utility-oriented or not, became problematic in the
long run (Tuve 1959: 174; Kistiakowsky 1966: 18).
While all these redefinitions can be interpreted as a claim to reintegrate
application goals into the concept of basic research, Bush himself actually did not
exclude the idea of mission-oriented research. Nathan Reingold sees ‘‘the pursuit of
new knowledge’’ – and not the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake – as the real
core of Bush’s notion of basic research. Reingold further refines his interpretation
by quoting Bush’s argument that ‘‘there is no specification as to whether the
knowledge is or is not of direct utility’’ (Reingold 1987: 305). That sheds a very
different light on the story of basic research. The importance of new scientific
knowledge becomes even clearer if we take into account Bush’s metaphor of ‘‘the
endless frontier’’, which emphasized the cutting-edge role of scientific research. It
thus placed scientific problems at the border of the unknown, reflecting the
uncertainty of scientific outcomes and their long lead time in a world increasingly
reliant upon scientific progress. Not least, Bush’s outline for a federal funding
programme entailed financial support for basic research (long-range scientific
research) on military matters.
Nevertheless, some of Bush’s contemporaries interpreted the report as an attempt
to return to the old intrinsic ideal of pure science. They criticized the report for
favouring a selfish notion of scientific autonomy that did not respond to any societal
or economic needs (Shepard 1946).16 My analysis thus far reveals that the
16 In 1944 and 1945 there was already an ongoing debate in letters to the editor of the journal Science that
critically reflected the re-idealization of the notion of pure science (Stern 1944; Pearson 1944; Robin
1944; Feibleman 1944; Alexander 1945; Stern 1945; Moore 1945; J. R. Baker 1945).
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discursive strategy of basic research initially aimed to acquire regular financial
support from the government by promising utility in spite of the uncertainty of
scientific research. This happened to conform to the interests of the scientific
profession, so long as this support did not affect the ideal of open science. In the
long run, however, the allegation of a return to an ancient pure-science ideal proved
to be true. As the promotion of basic research continued, the sustainability discourse
was transformed into a purity discourse, which revealed aspects of a past notion of
science deemed to have been superseded in the 20th century.
After having become the spearhead of scientific endeavour, surprisingly enough
American researchers looked back towards continental Europe. Post-war proposals
for higher education in the US idealized the European university system and its
humanistic tradition by associating it with democracy (Bender 1997: 4–5). The old
model of the European research university and its success story in basic disciplines
such as physics and chemistry became a role model. According to Bush’s report, the
arguments for reinvigorating the university within an increasingly pluralistic
research landscape were twofold: immense need for scientifically trained research-
ers and the demand for scientific autonomy.
American scientists had repeatedly commented on the short-sighted focus of
armaments research and on the threat Hitler’s regime implied for the freedom of
science, presenting the liberal democratic order as the only safeguard for the
fundamental principles of science (Fosdick 1934: 380; Simons 1943: 392; Goudsmit
1947: XI). The debates on lessons to be drawn from the war experience, however,
demonstrate that American scientists were chiefly worried about the threat to
scientific freedom with regard to their own national conditions (H. S. Taylor 1944:
255; Goudsmit 1947: 232–246). Bush’s report blamed previous federal policy –
from the Morill Land-Grant Colleges Act to the more recent practice of contract
research – for being primarily interested in immediate benefits. The report argued
that, due to an alleged inclination towards more utility-based research, the American
nation depended entirely on the European production of new scientific knowledge
(Bush 1945: 2; see also Astin 1959: 146–147).
By reproaching the societal and governmental focus on the utility of science,
Bush’s sustainability argument was just about to tilt over towards the purity ideal of
science. This explains why some scientists initially reclaimed the application aspect
of research. The related aspect of academic autonomy, however, met with the
approval of most scientists. Aside from the politicians supporting a science policy
agency like the Democrat Harley M. Kilgore (1945: 636), only a few scientists
argued frankly against the anxiety about governmental interference by pointing out
that the increasing social and economic demand for scientific research and the
necessary political coordination of research in response to these needs were facts
which scientists in the 20th century had to accept (Dunn 1945). Although the final
establishment of the National Science Foundation turned out to be a compromise for
all parties having negotiated this new form of federal science funding, Bush’s
altered definition of basic research, in the end, became accepted.
At the end of the 1950s, after the National Science Foundation had been
operating for several years, scientists continued to criticize the low federal base rate
for basic research in comparison to that of contract research in the Department of
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Defense, which was twice as high (Elvehjem 1959: 94; Waterman 1959: 26–27).
Some deployed the sophisticated argument that many projects were not truly basic
research, but actually mission-directed basic research. In fact, the Korean War had
meanwhile intensified the Cold War conflict and the Soviet’s launch of the Sputnik
satellite turned the ideological competition between West and East into a science
and technology race (Tuve 1959: 173–176). As a consequence, basic research stood
primarily for federally financed academic research – with or without any concept of
practical use.
From the outset, the various drafts of the documents formally establishing the
National Science Foundation included fellowships for graduates and junior
scientists, so that the concept of basic research was closely linked to training
scientific talent (Steelman 1947b: 29–30). From the late 19th century onwards, the
modern research university inevitably moved further and further away from the
traditional concept of a university as a specialized institution of higher education
that excluded any notion of material benefit or practical aims. Yet the post-war
debate on support for basic research led to a new version of the old boundary
discourse of pure versus applied and theory versus practice. At a major symposium
on basic research in May 1959, one representative of a private technical university
reasoned that the
most difficult questions arise as to what is fundamental research, what is
practical development, and which projects could be more appropriately done
in commercial laboratories. … One useful criterion which helps many
decisions in this field is that to be acceptable in any area a research program
must be one which is consistent with and contributes to the educational
program. This means it must be one in which graduate students can
participate. This means, among other things, it must not be ‘classified’, either
for reasons of trade secrecy or military security. (DuBridge 1959: 109–110)
In the discourse among academic teachers, the ideal of training ‘‘good scientists’’
was not compatible with military or other contract research (Elvehjem 1959: 94).
Even engineering sciences felt compelled to adopt pure-science ideals whereby
profit and research projects with self-serving interests should be taboo in institutions
of higher education as long as they were part of scientific training. Given the fact
that the growing number of military-related research projects at universities during
the Cold-War years often included doctoral students, these statements certainly did
not mirror the actual practice in the higher education of engineers (Dennis 1994).
They rather seem to reflect the increasing uneasiness with the security guidelines
related to contract research for the armed forces and the increasing number of
military-related research projects.
The call for new knowledge through basic research in the post-war era also
reached industry. Big companies such as DuPont or the Bell Telephone Company,
which could afford their own well-equipped laboratories, intended to expand their
participation in basic research after the war had ended (Fisk 1959). However, since
economic rationales entailed selecting projects that were most likely to lead to
innovation, these companies welcomed the idea of the federal government funding
riskier projects to be carried out at the universities (Greenewalt 1959: 130). After
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all, failures and deadlocks – all more or less inevitable parts of the scientific
production of knowledge – would cause costs they wanted to avoid. Furthermore,
industry representatives appreciated federal support for training the future
generation of researchers they needed. This division of labour was financially
promising for companies as ‘‘a technological savings account’’ (Greenewalt 1959).
While the amount of research carried out in direct response to economic and
military demands had increased tremendously since the Korean War (Killian 1959a:
122), the university was meant to become a sort of reservation for long-term basic
research within a changing research landscape. Academic freedom in the second
half of the 20th century largely sought to liberate science from over-the-top societal
expectations. Protecting scientific research ‘‘from the insistent demands of applied
research’’ became a central argument deployed by scientists as well as industry and
politics (Weaver 1959: XIV; see also Greenewalt 1959: 128). Yet what was initially
intended to protect scarce knowledge resources could, in the long run, transform
into an ideal of purity. The university was granted the status of a reservation in the
midst of a rapidly changing research landscape in order to protect science against
excessive expectations and thus guarantee the open development of scientific
knowledge. With the status of reservation, however, also came the danger that
research conditions be artificially conserved, making it difficult to respond to
changes in scientific practices.
The Revival of 19th-Century Epistemic Norms and Virtues
The shift from a discourse of knowledge sustainability to a discourse of purity
affected the epistemic concepts of science in particular and, in so doing, appeared to
hark back to ideas coursing in the 18th and 19th centuries. First and foremost, this
shift concerned the relationship between the natural sciences and technology.
Although Vannevar Bush himself dealt with basic questions in mathematics – a
central basic discipline in engineering – as well as with construction design in his
own research, his proposals ended up reviving the old distinction between nature
and technology because they made the distinction between engineering, on the one
hand, and the natural sciences, on the other.
Historians have explained this distinctive position on the natural sciences with
Bush’s personal concepts of administration and his ideas about achieving excellence
in science through specialized researchers, based, of course, on the premise that the
rationale of open science would guarantee the unhindered diffusion of knowledge
for the benefit of technical progress (Reingold 1987: 306–307). This relapse into
outdated concepts of science, however, cannot be reduced to the personal
preferences of Vannevar Bush. It should instead be seen as a broader academic
phenomenon, which began as a move to counter the increasing demand on science
for immediate benefits that reached its height during the Second World War, before
finally turning into a political programme in the West, nestled within the ideological
competition of the Cold War.
In order to protect basic research in the natural sciences, academic experts
wanted these disciplines to steer clear of any kind of technical development. As
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Alan T. Waterman (1959: 28) proclaimed in 1959, ‘‘the growing applications of
physics, chemistry, and mathematics should be shifted to engineering departments
and kept out of the regular science departments’’. In other words, from the point of
view of the natural sciences, applied research primarily meant research that sought
to yield future technology.
An oceanographical study carried out within the context of naval research in the
late 1940s and early 1950s reconfirms this one-dimensional understanding of
applied research in contrast to basic research. The US Office of Naval Research was
a staunch supporter of basic research in oceanography, yet the question of secrecy
revealed that the Navy and scientists differed in their classification of basic and
applied research and in their notion of utility. Oceanographers defined their
investigations of the topographical features or meteorological conditions of the
ocean as basic research as long as it did not expressly serve the development of
technology destined for use by the Navy. The Navy, however, developed ‘‘a more
sophisticated definition of basic research that would take its operational nature into
account’’ and demonstrated strategic utility of geography for military purposes
(Hamblin 2002: 27).
This purification of the natural sciences even affected the existing research
vocabulary. Science policy experts tried to find new labels for research fields in
engineering formerly classified as fundamental or basic research. The term
‘‘analytical engineering’’ is a good example of this renaming practice (Killian
1959a: 122). Moreover, in the debates revolving around basic research in the post-
war era, the whole attitude towards technology appeared to become more
ambivalent. In the 1950s, the National Science Foundation still justified the support
for basic research primarily by the goal of enhancing technical progress. At the
same time, it became ever more common for statements on science to conclude with
a declaration bearing the motivating force behind scientific endeavour; the pursuit of
knowledge for its own sake and the quest for truth became the appendix of federal
science policy (Waterman 1959: 37–40; Astin 1959: 154).
Researchers in innovation studies have associated post-war research policy with
the ‘‘linear model’’, that is with a linear trajectory from basic research in the natural
sciences to technology (Edgerton 2004). Implicit in the new policy of basic research
was a renaissance of the older epistemic notion of an asymmetry of knowledge and,
by association, the scientific preference for research led by theoretical questions.
Particular support for basic research in the natural sciences was grounded in the
hope that a few basic discoveries would be sufficient to significantly broaden the
potential for technological application (Elvehjem 1959: 98). In the process of
striving for the endless frontier of the unknown, the idea of major theories in the
natural sciences came to be the ultimate driving force of scientific progress and thus
a further argument for supporting basic research.
Even representatives of industrial research endorsed the orientation of academic
research towards theory in order to provide mutual benefit:
[T]he existence of even a crude and preliminary physical theory and the
heeding of it in the expectations and patterns of operation of scientific work
would permit coupling of the individual, uncommitted, undirected researcher
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to the general objectives of economic and social programs. … In the still
regrettably small list of findings from basic scientific research which have
been quickly and directly connected with large advances in technology and
useful operations are several important examples. In these, the really new idea
came out because a unifying theory had displaced the true possibilities – the
wide range of means rather than simply the ends themselves … (W. O. Baker
1959: 54).
This hierarchical and linear notion of knowledge production contrasted with a more
dynamic understanding of the relationship between fundamentally theoretical
questions and approaches that started out from a concrete problem of application.
Although the professional self-image of academic superiority certainly continued to
have an effect on epistemic ideas and norms in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, shifting research practices had already begun breaking up this static
epistemic model. As the special support of basic research and its distinctive position
within the different research activities was beyond dispute in the late 1950s,
representatives of industrial research or national laboratories only casually
mentioned the mutual reinforcement of theoretical and application problems they
encountered (Astin 1959: 145, 151; Fisk 1959: 160–161).
Debates on basic research eventually revealed another old epistemic ideal
referring to the intellectual qualities of researchers and to research conditions that
encouraged scientific creativity. New (federal) support for basic research initially
focused on individual researchers in order to foster ‘‘the development of the
individual scientist’’ (Waterman 1959: 34; see also Weaver 1959: XI; Greenewalt
1959: 128–131; Morison 1959: 230). Experts esteemed individual creativity as the
main property of outstanding scientists, enabling them to move forward into the
unknown. The free flow of unconstrained intellectual creativity was thus defined as
basic research. Not least, the financial relief stemming from regular federal funding
was well received as a guarantee of intellectual freedom (Tuve 1959).
This particular position was backed up by the revival of old academic virtues.
‘‘[T]ruly ‘basic research’ was driven by a passionate love for knowledge. Basic
research thus meant ‘support for ideas’ in the first place’’ (Tuve 1959: 174, 175; see
also Waterman 1959). This definition of basic research tended to be averse to
technology. Furthermore, the hierarchy of basic and applied research implied the
moral superiority of academic research over benefit-oriented industrial research,
even on the personal level of researchers (Elvehjem 1959: 94–96). In the end, the
epistemic virtue of disinterestedness – according to Robert Merton one of four
imperatives of modern science – got mixed up with social and moral values.
This deep appreciation of individuality was partly a reaction to the growing
experience of scientific teamwork, which had become common within large military
or industrial research projects. Individual creativity contrasted with the conservative
atmosphere of research groups, which tended to object to fresh, radical ideas
(Waterman 1959: 30; Tuve 1959: 176). Even those involved in industrial research
highlighted the advantage of academic research because companies were only able
to offer limited space for the individuality of their researchers. Furthermore, the
freedom of investigation was supposed to be a special incentive for academic
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research – an incentive that had to compete with the high salaries and the
technologically well-equipped laboratories in industrial research (Elvehjem 1959:
96–97). Praise for individuality in science, however, derived partly from the
ideological value of individualism in Western civilization. The first director of the
National Science Foundation, Alan T. Waterman, put it like this: ‘‘Surely one of the
great assets of democracy is the encouragement of individual initiative’’ (Waterman
1959: 25).
Democracy at Risk: The Ideological Role of Basic Research in the Cold-War US
The ideological potential of the basic-research concept contributed significantly to
the shift from a discourse of sustainability to one of purity. Politicians, for example
US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, translated the new science policy directly into
political slogans such as ‘‘Science: Handmaiden of Freedom’’ (Eisenhower 1959).
Politicians still placed great hopes and expectations on science as the pacemaker of
technical progress, capable of securing national security, national welfare, and
prosperity. At the same time, their support of basic research enabled politicians to
praise academic freedom as an overall value of liberal Western society. In addition
to this, federal funding for basic research, defined as support for individual initiative
and creativity, symbolized the individualism within democracy (Waterman 1959:
25). As a collective symbol bridging the gap between scientific and public discourse
by the polysemy of metaphors, basic research offered a true ideological surplus.
Politicians further contrasted the ‘‘limited or local application’’ within mission-
directed research with the universality of basic research designed to ‘‘benefit all
mankind’’ (Eisenhower 1959: 137). Leading the technological race with the launch
of its Sputnik satellite, the Soviet Union then stood for an application-oriented
understanding of science in the service of communist goals, whereas the Western
argument pertaining to the universality and openness of basic research claimed
ethical superiority.
During the 1950s, this high praise for free basic research stood in opposition to
the high percentage of projects funded by the military and the increased demands
for secrecy imposed on large areas of research in physics or other fields relevant to
military projects by US security policy. It is telling that, in 1951, Alan Waterman,
first director of the National Science Foundation and former technical director of the
Office of Naval Research, emphasized the role of science in the situation of national
emergency in the wake of conflict with the communist world; in spite of the
National Science Foundation’s basic research programme, he underlined the need
for science to focus on urgent application problems (Waterman 1951). According to
the literature (Forman 1987; Westwick 2000), patriotic mobilization among
scientists was still high. Many classified their research voluntarily, or adjusted to
political pressure for security by compartmentalizing research and forming
classified communities. Although these strategies were supposed to guarantee as
much scientific exchange as possible, secrecy meant that research largely took place
within a national context.
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Moreover, the debates in Science during the 1950s demonstrate that the secrecy
policy and the effects of a dominating military grip on science gave more and more
cause for concern within the scientific community. Scientists criticized the idea that
the military had a ‘‘sophisticated understanding of the needs of basic research’’,
arguing, moreover, that ‘‘those branches of pure science that lack military appeal are
as badly off financially as they ever were’’ (Phillips 1952: 440). In the early 1960s,
military or military-related institutes, such as the Office of Naval Research, were still
financing most academic research, in particular at prestigious universities (Leslie
1993). Against this backdrop, the political reading of basic research was not merely an
aspect of portraying the US as a liberal society to the outside world. The debate on
basic research also reflected, more controversially, the internal effects of the cold war
on research. The debate was embedded in a more general intellectual discourse on the
consequences of the predominant security policy and the growing power of the
military for democratic society (see, for example, Shils 1956: 176–191).
Eisenhower’s statements demonstrated this growing ambiguity. In his well-
known ‘‘Farewell Address’’ from 1961, the departing president, former supreme
allied commander and president of Columbia University, warned against the
growing power of a ‘‘military-industrial complex’’:
[W]e must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the
disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let
the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.
We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable
citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military
machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security
and liberty may prosper together. (Eisenhower 2003: 414)
Eisenhower construed financially attractive contract research as a threat to the
academic ‘‘fountainhead of free ideas’’. More importantly, he warned against the
menace to public policy and civil society of a new ‘‘scientific-technological elite’’
(Eisenhower 2003: 414–415). Although Robert Merton had already stressed the
similarity or affinity between open science and Western democracy, in the late
1950s and early 1960s Eisenhower and other politicians identified science as a threat
to democracy when a close connection between science, the military, and the
economy remained intact (Wang 1999b).
Along with the attribute of universality, another of Merton’s four imperatives of
modern science, the notion of truth also gained importance in this ideological
discourse (Waterman 1959: 39). The ideal of truth had already been part of the
ideological fight against fascism during the Second World War when researchers
emphasized that science offered more than technical applications: ‘‘American
science therefore has an especial duty to keep aflame the torch of free research for
truth, which is dimmed or gone out in so many lands’’ (Blakeslee 1940: 592).
As the natural sciences had needed a long time to set themselves apart from an
understanding of science dominated by natural philosophy, the revitalization of the
idea of universal truth appears anachronistic. In the 19th century, the natural
sciences developed a mechanical and structural understanding of objectivity based
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on methodological processes that sometimes even stood in contradiction to the quest
for truth and certitude (Daston 2000: 32–34). At the beginning of the 20th century,
the quest for truth had something old-fashioned about it in a scientific era in which
research was constantly doing away with established certainties.
Coping with Ethical Dilemmas in the Cold-War Era
During the Cold War, however, the attributes of truth and universality were
revitalized and became part of an effort to present science as a politically and
ideologically independent authority in society. From the viewpoint of politics,
science was able to act as a neutral authority upon which decision-makers could rely
(Price 1962: 1105). Scientists themselves praised the idea ‘‘that science has
something more valuable than its material gifts to offer. … Science can have no
dogma, no arbitrary authority, no ‘party line’’’ (Sinnott 1950: 125). Scientific virtues
of ‘‘objectivity, tolerance, reluctance to distort or suppress evidence, and willingness
to accept sound logic and demonstrable fact’’ were transformed into political virtues
(W. P. Taylor 1953: 449). At the same time, however, the position of impartial
experts tended to be morally overloaded when scientists were meant to become
missionaries of ‘‘reason and good will’’ in the fight against ‘‘falsehood and hate’’
(Sinnott 1950: 126; see also Szent-Gyo¨rgyi 1957; Rapoport 1957; Weaver 1961:
259). In fact, the democratic framing of basic research and the revival of knowledge
ideals in the tradition of Humanism led to a politicization of science and, as a result,
basic research itself became part of ideology, namely Western ideology.
Historians have already pointed to the various ideological dimensions of science
in the post-war period (Wang 1999a; Ash 2006: 30; for the social sciences and
humanities, see Bender 1997). Some scholars from science and technology studies
blame Robert Merton’s comparison of science in democracy with science in fascist
and communist regimes for the misconception of scientific ideals such as autonomy
and universality, a misconception that they have been trying to correct ever since
(see the overview in Daston 2000: 18–20). But the societal, political, and ethical
implications of the basic-research concept were embraced by the scientific
community, even without sociological mediation.
After the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the role of science in society
certainly became more contradictory (Conant 1961: 6–13). While researchers had
wholeheartedly praised the salutary benefits of science before Hiroshima (A.
H. Compton 1940: 56), contemporaries noted afterwards that the ‘‘atom bomb once
and for all explodes the ‘neutrality’ of technology’’ (Shepard 1946: 66). The promise of
progress was only one side of the coin. Scientists became increasingly aware of the
burden of responsibility in their own research. Some of them hoped to avoid this problem
by pursuing more theoretical research topics. Others tried to take political action, such as
the atomic physicists’ movement, which fought for civilian use of scientific knowledge
and technological invention. But the anxious atmosphere during the Cold War period –
anti-communist harassment and the increasing public fear of a new scientific-
technological elite – aggravated the ethical dilemmas of post-war science.
A statement made by the physicist Julius Robert Oppenheimer, a leading figure in
the Manhattan Project, about the debate on basic research indicates scientists’
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uneasiness when they were faced with these dilemmas: ‘‘The argument that the
quest for new knowledge, which is basic science, is ennobling, and the argument
that the quest for new knowledge produces new knowledge which is useful to
technology and thus to practice, are disturbingly separate and unrelated arguments.
… Yet science and technology are symbiotic’’ (Oppenheimer 1959: 9; for a similar
argument, see W. O. Baker 1959: 43–47). Oppenheimer seemed to suspect that the
debate on basic research simply reflected these modern dilemmas. It is striking, but
also telling, that he tried hard to avoid the dualistic semantics that characterized
science policy at this time. Oppenheimer explicitly raised the political problems
brought about by the powerful scientific culture of the 20th century. Taking the
growing criticism toward scientists into account, the physicist believed that making
the public understand research goals had become difficult. While the impact of
science on society had increased tremendously, the fast growth of scientific
knowledge and technical innovations made it hard for laypersons to judge issues in
science policy. Oppenheimer feared that this asymmetry of knowledge between
experts and the lay public weakened democratic political decision-making
(Oppenheimer 1959: 12–13).17
The charges brought by the McCarthy Committee in 1954 against Oppenheimer
relating to his opposition to the hydrogen bomb illustrate that scientists who were
willing to assume responsibility for their research by taking political action had to
learn the hard way that there was little room in the political climate of the Cold War
to deal openly with these dilemmas of modern science (Bird and Sherwin 2005:
462–550). With regard to scientists of the progressive left advocating a more utility-
oriented notion of science, Jessica Wang notes that ‘‘[a]lthough their views on the
structure of postwar science were not directly responsible for their political
difficulties in every case, these scientists and others who embraced a liberal-left
politics of science were likely to hold other views that made them vulnerable to anti-
communist attacks and excluded them from political influence’’ (Wang 1995: 166).
In the mid 1950s, the National Science Foundation and the Academy of Science
included the criterion of national loyalty into their peer-review system for
unclassified research. Both organisations thus sought to avoid allegations of
supporting researchers who were suspected of sympathising with communist ideas
(Waterman 1960: 127; Committee on Loyalty in Relation to Government Support of
Unclassified Research 1956).
The question of loyalty arose especially when it came to discussing technological
application, as an official statement by the President of Associated Universities
addressed to the Committee on Government Operations confirmed:
If a scientist expresses a strong view on some technological matter that may be
contrary to the application of technology to current or to subsequent policy, he
is open to the accusation of taking this view with the intent of deliberate
subversion. … Moreover, secrecy prevents him from stating the essential
technical grounds on which his view is based. Therefore, in the simple process
17 See also James C. Connant’s contribution to the debate on the relationship between science and the
public (1951). For more details, see Hershberg (1993: 554–577).
What is Basic Research? 311
123
of doing his job for his country well, he is open to damaging criticism against
which he is permitted to produce little defense. (Berkner 1956: 784–785)
Given this pitfall, the discursive separation of science from technology provided a
strategy to avoid the risk of being forced to go ‘‘politicking’’, which gradually came
to be considered as the ‘‘disease’’ of the project research dominating American
universities at that time (Gates 1958: 234).
In this particular situation (the ethical dilemmas of the techno-scientific world,
the fragile relationship between science and the public in democracy, and the
ideological antagonism during the Cold War), the dissociation of the natural
sciences from applied research and any practical application of scientific knowledge
was thought to offer a strategy of individual, professional, and institutional relief:
Firstly, a strategy that avoids assuming ethical responsibility for the changes caused
by scientific knowledge. Secondly, a sort of self-protecting strategy that sought to
avoid the direct line of political fire in a society entirely concerned with national
security, the latter which produced an atmosphere of suspicion. And thirdly, a
strategy of political neutrality and independence from any self-serving interests as a
means of guaranteeing the institutional freedom of academic science and a self-
regulating scientific community which, from a scientific point of view, was best
capable of dealing with the open and often unpredictable process of epistemic
progress. The scientific community retreated into a ‘‘satisfactory philosophy of
ignorance’’; as long as science was defined as institutionalized scepticism, it was
still possible to maintain the belief in science or scientific knowledge as an
indispensable value of modern civilization (Feynman 1955: 15).
Conflicting Promises and Their Effects on the Public Image of Science
This neutral position secured the federal funding of research at universities in the
US – something the universities had longed for since the 1920s. In return, academic
researchers promised simply that science would lay the foundation for progress.
They also offered their expertise to politics, thus acting as an independent authority
over truth in a pluralistic, democratic society. The certainty academic scientists
offered appeared to be especially welcome at a time in which society was driven by
great anxiety. With regard to the outside image of the US during the Cold War, the
universities’ role as reservations devoted to autonomous science served as a symbol
for Western liberal society in the tradition of Humanism amid the great ideological
competition, while simultaneously providing fig-leaf camouflage for the technol-
ogy-based arms race. The post-war understanding of scientific autonomy was, in
fact, the result of a broad process of the politicization of science arising from the
growing importance of scientific knowledge for society.
Since there is, by definition, no clear solution for dilemmas, the strategy of basic
research inevitably caused problems for the relationship between science and the
public in the long run. Articles on this relationship and on topics such as the
responsibility of science in the late 1950s show that public mediation between the
needs of science and those of society became increasingly problematic (Killian
1959b: 136; Sayre 1961; Price 1962). According to Bender, this understanding of
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the autonomy of science, in particular the position of elitist experts and how they
neglected their responsibilities, alienated science from society, evoked the
impression of an academic ivory tower, and, finally, ended in federal budget cuts
for academic research (Bender 1997: 8–12).
Moreover, I argue that the simple promises of truth and progress scientists had
avowed to society covered the complexity and uncertainty of research dynamics as
well as the tentativeness of contested scientific knowledge. Moreover, the authority
of scientific objectivity and methodologically certified knowledge revealed its
limitations during political negotiations on values and societal goals; the position of
moral neutrality might bewilder the public. It could thus lead to disappointment,
misunderstanding, and even to the loss of science’s integrity in the public sphere.
Furthermore, the increasing interlocking of technology and the natural sciences was
also hidden behind praise for basic research. Since technological innovation had
become part of the natural sciences, questions of risk and utility had inevitably
arisen and transformed themselves into political and ethical issues: Who will profit
from the results? How do we manage risks?
Only few researchers at that time anticipated that the excessive expectations of
and contradictory demands on research might turn the public against science (W.
O. Baker 1959: 48; Dryden 1954). The shift from a discourse of knowledge
sustainability to one of purity meant that the concept of basic research itself sent
contradictory signals to the public: ‘‘The uneasiness of scientists on this score is
revealed by the observation that, whereas they claim among themselves that their
primary interest is in the conceptual, not in the applied, aspects of science, in public
they justify basic research by asserting that it always leads to ‘useful’ results’’
(Dubos 1961: 1209; see also Daniels 1967).
In fact, the concept of basic research and the underlying linear model of
innovation had already come under attack in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The
long-term and highly speculative nature of scientific research was difficult to
communicate to a public that expected economic prosperity and welfare here and
now. Society’s disappointment backfired on the scientific community and stimulated
a debate about the appropriateness of dissociating basic from applied research
(Abelson 1966; Reagan 1967). Yet this crisis is another chapter in the conceptual
history of basic research and goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Despite recurring crises, the concept of basic research functioned as a collective
symbol for science policy over quite a long period of time. Moreover, the semantics
of the new US science policy spread across the entire Western world. Ever since the
National Science Foundation established a periodical survey of overall research in
the US based on the categories basic research, applied research, and development
(the final stage of innovation, when technologies or ideas are turned into marketable
products), nearly all countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) adopted this classification (OECD 1976). Basic research and
its corresponding categories were converted into enduring statistical realities that
played a crucial role in budget planning within industry and in funding allocation
undertaken by government bodies (Godin 2005b).
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Fundamental Research in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Brief Overview
In the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter referred to as West Germany),
fundamental research also became a key concept in science policy. The impact of
the American role model on West Germany is quite obvious. Within the context of
re-education and development programmes, those representing US science
promoted their concept of science in democracy with its special focus on
fundamental research in West Germany (Conant 1953; Bush 1954). However, the
national characteristics of the German research landscape coupled with the
historical burden of the Nazi past meant that the way fundamental research and
its corresponding discourses were implemented differed to a certain degree from the
American experience. I will briefly mention some of these Germany-specific
characteristics in order to maintain a balance between the two national perspectives.
After the Second World War, the Allies assumed control of science in Germany
with the intention of suppressing all further research activities relevant to the
development of armaments. Allied Control Council Acts and the ensuing executive
regulations specified by each of the Western occupation zones forbade any
fundamental or applied scientific research with military relevance (Frowein 1949,
1950).18 It is remarkable that the crucial criterion for prohibition was the military
potential of research projects rather than the difference between fundamental and
applied research.
Similar to the American reaction to Bush’s proposals, discussions within the
German scientific community over the dissociation of basic from applied research
were quite controversial in the initial post-war years. Those from engineering or the
applied sciences were particularly confused by this distinction and felt insecure about
their future position and status within academia (Vieweg 1950: 731–732; So¨rensen
1952: 158). The creation of compounds such as ‘‘applied fundamental research’’
(angewandte Grundlagenforschung) was a further German strategy designed to
overcome this confusion in engineering (Heiss 1950: 121, 127; Wever 1952: 1053).
In order to cope with the Nazi past, the concept of pure science was initially more
attractive because of its moral connotation in the sense of innocence. Many
scientists labelled their research activities during the Nazi period retrospectively as
pure science in order to avoid being accused of complying with and supporting the
former fascist regime (Mehrtens 1994). In general, the revival of ideals belonging to
the 19th-century concept of pure science was more extensive than in the US.
Reference to the Humanist notion of education became part of the programme to
democratise society. This notion thus shaped the self-understanding of German
universities, which culminated in a re-glorification of the Prussian university
reformer Wilhelm von Humboldt, who had emphasized the educational function of
18 The exact German terms deployed in the two key laws, the Kontrollratsgesetz no. 25 from 29.04.1946
and the Milita¨rregierungsgesetz, no. 23 from 12.09.1949 were ‘‘grundlegende wissenschaftliche
Forschung’’ and ‘‘angewandte wissenschaftliche Forschung’’. The regulations defined military relevance




science.19 German professors embraced the older scientific ideal of truth-seeking as
the ultimate motive for research.20
Right after the war, German academics tried hard to avoid the impression that
their research was driven by any political or economic interests. The US occupying
forces certainly wanted to keep science at a great distance to politics, but they did
not seek to suppress economically and technically promising research (Cassidy
1996: 200–206). In fact, the growing tension with the Soviet Union meant that the
Marshall Plan’s aim was speedy economic recovery in both Germany and Western
Europe. John Krige has already pointed out that the basic-research concept played a
key role in reconstructing European science under ‘‘American hegemony’’. Firstly,
the concept was important for communicating the US financial support for the
former wartime enemies towards the American public. Secondly, it transported the
Western ideology and was therefore part of the envisioned democratization process
in central Europe. Finally, the US promoted basic research as unclassified research
in the allied countries in order to increase its stock of scientific knowledge and thus
to secure the American technological leadership (Krige 2010).
The German discourse on the general role of science in society defined scientific
knowledge primarily as a cultural good in order to strip off the Nazi past: science
was given a religious appeal (Walden 1946; Rein 1946; Reppe 1950: 1; Erbe 1954).
However, even scientists such as the physicist Otto Hahn, who argued strongly that
research in the natural sciences should abstain from any economic or technological
considerations, advocating instead that science ought to be driven by the thirst for
knowledge, campaigned for research funding by highlighting examples of scientific
discoveries that eventually led to successful products or innovative technology
(Hahn 1949, 1954).
Overall, the German concept of fundamental research resembled the US one in
many ways. It encompassed the idea of the long-term perspective and that of the
scientific knowledge reservoir or resource, the demand for scientific talent,
individual creativity in research, and the belief in disciplinary specialisation (see,
for instance, Reppe 1950). Eventually, fundamental research also became the key
concept in the public funding of research in West Germany. However, the Germans’
attempt to institutionally dissociate academic research from research promising
primarily economic utility was much more radical than in the US. West Germany
founded the German Research Foundation in order to fund academic research and
the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (Fraunhofer Society) as the funding body responsible
for economically relevant research.
The German Research Foundation’s crucial criterion for defining fundamental
research was the institutional autonomy of academic research. According to a
number of historical studies, this particular focus on fundamental research implied a
19 In the German university tradition, Humboldt represents the link between education and research. For
the current state of research on Humboldt’s role in university discourse, see Eichler (2012), Jarausch
(1999).
20 The semantic differences between the two versions of the speech held by philosopher Karl Jaspers in
1923 and 1946 are significant when defining the role of universities in the wake of changes to the
respective political systems: while Jaspers emphasized the objectivity of scientific knowledge in 1923, he
replaced the term ‘‘objectivity’’ with ‘‘truth’’ in 1946 (Jaspers 1923; 1946).
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restoration of the power held by full professors (known in Germany as the
Ordinariensystem). As the demands for the applied and the technical sciences were
growing continually, in 1956, the German Research Foundation also established a
special commission for funding applied research. However, this commission failed
to gain importance as an instrument for promoting research in the technical sciences
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 1956). Technical universities therefore had to
look for financial support from another quarter. In the end, the ideal of fundamental
research in West Germany seemed to slow down the institutional emancipation of
technical colleges from universities. Furthermore, academic research lost contact
with expensive, major scientific projects carried out in publicly funded research
institutes (Orth 2011).
All in all, the shift from a discourse of sustainability to one of purity after the
Second World War appears to have been a transnational process, although both the
background and the intensity of the purity ideals in the US and in West Germany
differed from one another. In both nations, the purity discourse implied a revival of
scientific ideals dating back to the 19th century. West Germany adopted the
American imperative of basic research, but German scientists referred more
extensively to the Humanist tradition of academia because they had to dissociate
themselves from their Nazi past. As universities were supposed to play an important
role in Germany’s effort to progress towards democracy, academic science was
defined by primarily educational ideals. The call for basic research after the Second
World War in the US initially sought to maintain federal funding for academic
research in order to enable scientific talent to flourish without it being subject to
pressure from the expectation of benefit held by society. Basic research became a
key concept in US federal science policy because the latter defined science as a
common good with a long-term perspective. However, the fact that this key concept
became crucial in the long run can be explained only by the fact that it functioned as
a discursive strategy designed to cope with the political and ethical dilemmas of
science during the Cold War.
Conclusions
This article has sought to demonstrate the importance of an historical approach in
order to, firstly, understand the complex meanings of basic research and, secondly,
answer the two questions of why science policy revolved around the concept of
basic research and its dissociation from applied research for such a long time, and
why this is still such a hot topic in science and technology studies today. If we
continue to describe basic research as a timeless, clearly definable mode, even as an
ideal type of research in contrast to applied research, we completely overlook the
reason why this key concept in modern science policy emerged at all. In fact, this
study has shown that the term basic research cannot be seen as a simple synonym for
the older notion of pure science. As a consequence, the assumption made in social-
scientific studies that the ideal of basic research structured modern science
continuously up until the postmodern era, when application-oriented research was
thought to gain predominance, needs to be corrected.
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As the term basic research emerged in the early 20th century and became more
common only in the late 1930s, it is actually quite young. Basic research is best
described as a collective symbol of science policy designed to bridge the gap
between the desire to support research, despite the fact that scientific output is
unpredictable and that the expectations placed upon science by society have been
growing constantly during the 20th century. For the history of basic research, it is
crucial to note that the concept itself (as well as similar terms such as fundamental
research) initially emerged in both the natural sciences within research fields that
pursued explicitly practical ends and subdisciplines of engineering that targeted
technological innovation and improvement.
While science profited financially from society’s growing demand for research,
researchers simultaneously faced pressure from society’s expectation that science
should produce immediately exploitable knowledge. In deploying the concept of
basic research, scientists promised the public that research would lay the ultimate
foundation for all sorts of progress and innovation, while at the same time
conveying the experience that scientific research was time-consuming and its
outcome and technical applications were hard to predict. Until 1945, basic research
primarily meant long-term research in the natural sciences that was ultimately
expected to solve practical problems.
After the Second World War, basic research became a central concept of US
science policy, which particularly promoted research at universities and non-profit
research institutes. Although the scientific promise of progress remained an
important message in this concept after 1945, the discourse revolving around basic
research shifted considerably in the post-war period from a discourse of knowledge
sustainability to a discourse of purity. During the war, scientists had learnt to value
massive governmental support of research, but they were concerned that the short-
term planning of war-related research and its security restrictions would put the
sustainability of both scientific knowledge and manpower at risk in the long run.
Believing that scientists knew best when it came down to making science flourish
and knowing what it took to explore the unknown, the challenge for scientists was
legitimizing the continuance of federal science funding while at the same time
advocating the institutional autonomy of science.
To this end, science policy advisers such as Vannevar Bush revived a long-
lasting semantic reservoir of scientific ideals. By dissociating scientific knowledge
from its potential applications, it became possible to define academic research as a
common good capable of laying claim to federal protection, just as the older concept
of pure science had done before. Bush’s proposal focused on the natural sciences,
whose studies in the fundamental principles of nature were thought to offer nearly
endless possibilities for technical innovation. Moreover, this new definition
responded to the educational tasks undertaken by universities in which research
projects were part of scientific qualification. The self-concept of higher education
institutions traditionally kept their distance from any utilitarian aspects of scientific
knowledge.
The distinction between basic and applied research thus served, first and
foremost, as a criterion governing the allocation of federal funding, implemented
through the newly founded National Science Foundation. Although the majority of
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researchers were grateful for the new federal support for research, the concept of
basic research became the subject of controversies in the late 1940s because it
reanimated ideals and norms of the older, European discourse of pure science. With
these semantic references, basic research evoked older epistemic and social
hierarchies. Research was seen to be more theory- than problem-oriented, the
natural sciences assumed moral superiority over the technical sciences, and
academic researchers were considered morally superior to industrial researchers.
The individual pursuit of knowledge ennobled academic researchers, who became
detached from immediate demands so that scientific creativity was given free rein.
To a certain extent, the re-establishment of older scientific ideals was a reaction
to the exceptional conditions of wartime research. In many research fields, however,
the ideals belonging to a former notion of science contradicted the changed
practices in and demands placed on research in the 20th century. In particular, the
idea of keeping technology apart from the natural sciences, which derived from an
artificial funding demarcation, appeared anachronistic. These social and epistemic
attributions of basic research looked like a cultural lag in modern science.
The reason why the concept of basic research, with all its reminiscences to
former purity discourses, finally prevailed was that it functioned as a discursive
strategy to cope with the difficult relationship between science and the public, the
ideologically charged atmosphere of the Cold War, and the ethical dilemmas in
science during the second half of the 20th century. When it comes to the political
dimension of the concept of basic research, there are usually references to Robert
Merton or Michael Polanyi, who stated that only democracy guaranteed full
scientific autonomy and that, vice versa, scientific independence was a prerequisite
of democratic pluralism because it presented a disinterested authority of truth
(Merton 1942; Polanyi 1962). This self-image of science as being autonomous and
disinterested was partly a result of Western ideology competing with the Soviet
Union during the Cold War.
The effects of the Cold War on domestic politics were a major challenge to the
scientific community. The first use of the atomic bomb rendered discussion of the
goals of science unavoidable. Scientists who took part in the debate about the
application of scientific knowledge for good or bad discovered that there was little
room for negotiation in Cold-War America. At the same time, the relationship
between the scientific community and the public became ever tenser as cooperation
between science and the military increased. American intellectuals perceived this
military-science nexus as a threat to US democratic culture. As a consequence,
resorting to basic research was part of a strategy of relief – not only relief from
society’s expectation of science to produce immediate benefits, but also from
political controversies that might affect a researcher’s reputation and put his or her
chances of acquiring funding at risk.
The success of this key concept in science policy lay in the polysemy of ‘‘basic’’,
which functioned as a kind of self-reassurance within the scientific community and
could be used to signal societal utility when communicating to the wider public. The
concept of basic research thus worked as collective symbol linking the public
discourse to the scientific discourse. The label ‘‘basic’’ signified that research was a
precondition for future scientific progress. At the same time, it communicated the
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fundamental importance of research for societal or economic and technological
progress.
In the end, the concept of basic research could not solve the dilemmas of science
in 20th-century societies. In fact, it produced its own confusion and misleading
expectations. The simplified promise of progress depended on society’s confidence,
which dwindled during the economic crisis of the 1970s. Particularly after the
discourse on basic research referred to the intrinsic ideal of science for its own sake,
society’s trust was put at risk. In addition, the simplified promise of scientific
objectivity – the alleged neutrality of facts – obscured the actual complexity of
research, where scientific truth is always contested.
Which lessons can we draw from this analysis for the current theoretical debate
in science and technology studies? Bruno Latour’s argument against basic research
is well taken in so far as the semantics of the concept do not represent the actual
research practices and their institutional settings. As the above analysis has shown,
the same type of criticism was already voiced by contemporaries of Vannevar Bush.
Bush’s definition of basic research, especially his dissociation of the natural
sciences from the technical sciences and its purity ideals, however, were more than
just a simple misrepresentation: they had a long-lasting effect on the Western notion
of science and research policy.
The resort to purity ideals can be blamed for retarding or interrupting this
reflective process within the natural sciences. Moreover, there are hints that the
reference to older scientific ideals led to taboos being placed on research topics
leading to technical innovations, at least in some disciplines within the natural
sciences. Eric J. Vettel has demonstrated how the revival of the policy of pure
science in the 1950s altered research topics and institutional organization in
microbiology and how the turn toward an application-oriented research policy
during the 1960s led, in the long run, to biotechnology (Vettel 2006). The discipline
of biology is thus a good example for demonstrating that parts of this purity
discourse have, once again, faded away. The self-image of researchers like Craig
Venter, geneticist and entrepreneur, no longer corresponds to the old image of the
quiet academic scholar (Venter 2007). These recent historical shifts have indeed
been noted by science studies. But we need more long-term historical studies on
individual research fields and disciplines – studies tracing the historical develop-
ment of research topics as far back as the late 19th and early 20th centuries – in
order to understand the effects of the return of the purity discourse after 1945.
Bruno Latour has described purity discourses as a typically modern phenomenon
that has since become less important. The results of this analysis, however, show
that the concept of basic research had many functions. Aside from its role as a
criterion for distributing research funding, the concept of basic research mainly
served as a strategy for coping, firstly, with society’s increasing expectations of
science, secondly, with the ethical dilemmas associated with the debate on the
overall purpose of science, and, thirdly, with the political implications of science’s
role as an increasingly powerful force in society. The case of the US shows that,
despite the initial criticism of anachronism, the revival of the purity discourse
succeeded because the concept of basic research became a strategy to cope with the
uncertainties and dilemmas of the Cold-War period.
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In fact, many of these dilemmas will continue to challenge science policy in the
21st century. As science and technology have become powerful forces in our
societies, they will be subject to both conflicts of interest and political and ethical
controversies. Whether the strategy of dealing with these controversies will continue
to characterize basic research is, however, an open question. On the one hand, some
representatives of science and technology studies believe that previous strategies
have failed in coping with these dilemmas (Jasanoff 2005: 6; Shapin 2010:
387–391). On the other hand, new concepts like the European Research Council’s
‘‘frontier research’’ seem to revive the basic-research concept – at least with regard
to its original function as part of a discourse on knowledge sustainability, which the
current article has sought to reveal (High-Level Expert Group 2005: 16).21
Analysis of these discourses provides us with insights into expectations placed
upon future research and into societal and scientific experiences from the past,
which, among other things, frame decisions about what kind of research society
wants and what kind of research should be funded by the public purse. Historical
semantics can help to elucidate scientific taboos, which are taken for granted
because they are the outcome of specific political or societal situations. All in all,
historical semantics could be one useful approach among many in science and
technology studies. It provides a critical perspective on the complex relationship
between science and society. Moreover, it helps to reveal the historical legacy of our
notions of science and technology, including their multiple attributes, which are still
very present, although this seems to have gone unnoticed by many contemporary
observers. This is why the analysis of concepts such as basis research is (still) an
interesting, worthwhile subject for science studies. However, with regard to the
legacy of the concept of basic research, this article suggests that it should not be
used as a technical term whose meanings can be taken for granted. Scholars in the
field of science and technology studies are thus well advised to explicate which of
the many facets of the term they allude to when using the concept of basic research.
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